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The goal of this thesis is to analyze the relationship of economic inequality to protest               
occurrence alongside other factors across autocratic regimes.  
 
Earlier work has done much to explore the diversity of autocracies and their policy outcomes.               
Others have examined how economic inequality may affect resources and grievances. And            
the relationship of technology with protest participation has been considered. However these            
have rarely been examined in unison. The relationship of inequality with protest across             
autocracies remains under-examined, as do the effects of coercion and technology. 
 
I combine these elements into one analysis of autocratic countries between 1990 and 2014. I               
examine the correlation between inequality and protest events alongside regime categories,           
the use of coercion, ICT usage among the population, and other variables identified as              
relevant. In order to investigate these connections, I perform a regression analysis using             
panel-corrected standard errors. My data is derived from a variety of cross-sectional            
time-series datasets. 
 
My empirical analysis shows that economic inequality and regime type do not appear to be               
statistically significant overall in their interactions or main effects. According to the data, only              
regime coercion and ICT penetration show significant relationships with protest. My findings            
suggest that any impact of economic inequality alone is outweighed by the effects of              
improved human rights standards and new technologies. Alternatively, they may indicate the            
importance of other types of inequality or different moderating elements. The significance (or             
lack thereof) of my findings might also reflect relationships with protest incidents more than              
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In recent years, both news media and academic discussions have linked economic inequality             
with political unrest. News headlines have claimed that “most” popular protest may be linked              
with global economic inequality (Massing 2020), while others have observed it alongside            
other factors like political restriction and corruption (BBC 2019). A 2019 UN Human             
Development Report highlights how economic factors are interlinked with inequalities that           
threaten human development, affecting people's opportunities and choices (UN News 2019).           
National preferences for more equal income have increased from the 2000s to the 2010s              
worldwide regardless of political orientation, at the same time a wave of protest has been               
observed from 2010 onwards (UNDP 2019, 23; Korotayev, Meshcherina, and Shishkina           
2018). 
 
That is not to assume that these are directly connected, but one is certainly plausible: the                
idea that inequality drives revolution and dissent predates the earliest philosophers (Muller            
1985, 47; Nagel 1973). Previous research has highlighted the diverse linkages of economic             
inequality. Among others, it is shown to have connections with political protest, violence, and              
even terrorism. Significant attention has also been given to its relationship with            1
democratization and democratic backsliding.  2
 
Autocracies - non-democracies - are relevant to examine in pursuit of a more stable and               
egalitarian world. The creation and ending of authoritarian regimes can help us better             
understand how democracies are built and maintained. Beyond cautionary examples, they           
offer insights into the nature of successful institutions. Examining how they gain - and lose -                
the support of citizens can help us understand the elements needed for good governance.              
Studying why some autocracies outperform others offers insight into how institutions may            
succeed or fail to work in the interests of a broad range of citizens, and why democracy                 
sometimes fails to achieve ideal policy outcomes (Besley and Kudamatsu 2007). By            
examining protest and other elements, we are able to connect institutional structures and             
policies with an observable metric for popular legitimacy - public dissent. By extension, we              
can draw conclusions regarding democratic representation and ideals. 
 
This insight is increasingly relevant in today’s context. The nature of authoritarian leadership             
is changing, posing a threat to any assumptions about democracy. As observed by John              
Keane, dictators are gaining durability and increased support from a broad middle-class base             
(Keane 2020). Keane characterizes this as a “fundamental challenge to power-sharing           
democracy” (Keane 2020), remarking how dictatorships have adapted democratic institutions          
and tactics to gain support. Similarly, scholars have warned against a current wave of              
de-democratization undermining equality and creating a global crisis (Diamond 2019;          
Lührmann et al. 2019; Maerz et al. 2020). A wave of autocratization is occurring that               
1 See: ​Nagel 1973; Muller 1985; Houle 2018; Krieger and Meierrieks 2019; Bodea, Elbadawi, and               
Houle 2016; Houle 2016a; Grasso and Giugni 2016; Solt 2015; 2008. 
2 See: Brancati 2014; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Haggard and Kaufman 2012; Houle 2016b;              
Bonica et al. 2013; Sirowy and Inkeles 1990; Öniş 2016. 
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undermines democratic regimes while adopting many of their attributes (Lührmann and           
Lindberg 2019). Deeper attacks on democratic ideals are becoming more commonplace           
(Maerz et al. 2020; Lührmann et al. 2020). Despite this, pro-democracy mobilization has also              
increased within the past decade, creating a countering force for democratization and            
resistance - including within autocracies (Maerz et al. 2020). 
 
In analyzing protest in autocracies, we can seek out lessons to strengthen democracy where              
it exists and encourage its growth where it does not. Protest offers a way to measure popular                 
legitimacy, democratic activism, and social discontent. By understanding how protest is           
motivated or suppressed in different contexts, we can work to better understand how             
democratic movements arise. Through the differences in protest among autocracies we can            
connect this with other elements, by extension learning how good governance may be             
crafted and sustained in the future. 
 
In order to do so, we require clear data to make these connections. Owing to several gaps in                  
the literature, it is still unclear whether economic inequality is significant to explain variation in               
protest across autocracies.  
 
While protest and inequality have been examined throughout the literature, bivariate           
measures of democracy have often treated autocracies as a largely homogenous group. Of             
those which have acknowledged variation, many have focused on comparing autocracies to            
democracies. Notable events like the Arab Spring and the associated protest wave have, in              
some aspects, overshadowed larger analysis. There is still a limited amount of research             
examining protest events across non-democratic regime types. The relationship of protest           
with other factors such as economic inequality and technology usage has been inadequately             
considered. To what degree economic inequality motivates protests across autocracies is           
largely under-researched. 
 
The relevant literature is also becoming dated. Although existing research provides excellent            
foundations of knowledge, the pace of change within the past few decades requires new              
data. Considering the trends of autocratization mentioned earlier, this is especially crucial.            
Not only has economic globalisation changed our society, but this wave of autocratization is              
accelerating worldwide (Maerz et al. 2020). In order to fully interpret world events in this               
context, it is vital that we have the most current information. 
 
Relatedly, much of the previous research of authoritarian regimes also takes place before or              
earlier during the growth of internet technologies worldwide. Not only does this present a              
noticeable gap when considering the use of mobile phones in protest actions from Hong              
Kong to Belarus, but it means that findings from decades ago may be less comparable with                
today’s context. 
 
The research question I seek to answer is: ​How does inequality explain variation in protest               
levels among autocracies? Through investigating the relationship of mass mobilization with           




First, I examine autocracies exclusively, paying attention to the institutional and structural            
differences used to categorize them. I consider the impact of income inequality alone, how              
this may interact with various regime type categories, and how it may compare to other               
relevant variables. Second, I use a recent dataset of protest occurrence, limiting my analysis              
to between 1990 and 2014. Finally, I introduce the element of technology alongside other              
variables identified as relevant in the literature. I consider not only the presence of              
communications technology, but its relationship to the total population. 
 
In addressing these research gaps and examining variations of protest across autocratic            
regime types, I aim to contribute to future research on the structural causes of these               
variations. 
 
In order to answer this research question, I hypothesize based on existing literature that              
economic inequality is likely to have an overall negative relationship with protest. This might              
be conditioned by the type of political regime. I also consider that the use of coercion and                 
information technology are likely to affect protest occurrence. I hypothesize a negative            
relationship for coercion and protest, but a positive one for information technology and             
protest.  
 
To investigate these connections, I conduct a regression analysis using cross-sectional           
time-series data drawn from a variety of sources. I examine the correlation of inequality to               
protest events alongside regime type categories, the use of coercion, ICT usage, and other              
variables identified as relevant. 
 
The results of my empirical analysis show that the only significant relationships found are              
mobile device usage and regime coercion measured as respect for physical rights. Economic             
inequality and regime type do not appear to be statistically significant according to my data.  
 
My findings suggest that national economic inequality as measured is less significant than             
believed. Instead, improved human rights and the proportion of mobile device usage appear             
more important. Any impact of economic inequality alone appears outweighed by these            
effects. Key interactions of inequality that lead to mobilization may not lie with the regime               
structure itself, but be found in other institutional aspects instead. Or my results may suggest               
that other types of inequality are more important, such as inequalities within groups. A final               
possibility is that the significance (or lack thereof) of my findings reflect relationships with              
protest occurrence, but not necessarily protest size or longevity. 
 
I begin by analyzing previous literature. Next, my theoretical framework is discussed, before             
proceeding into my research design. Here I give an overview of my data sources and               
variables. I show the results of my analysis, discussing my results, possible limitations, and              




2. Literature Review 
Starting with an overview of how political protest is discussed throughout the literature, I              
discuss the role of collective grievances, resources, and opportunity structures. I next            
examine economic inequality as a potential grievance, discussing how it may motivate or             
deter protest. I examine the importance of autocratic regime types, and separately explore             
the use of regime coercion. Finally, I note the role of technology as an important variable,                
and discuss other elements to consider. 
2.1 Protest 
To begin, the literature offers several definitions of political protest. ​Protest can be defined              3
as collective and disruptive manifestations which seek to give political bargaining power to             
relatively powerless people (Eisinger 1973, 13).  
 
Discussing American Civil Rights protests during the 1960s, Lipsky conceptualized protest as            
political action against objectionable policies or conditions which seeks resolutions from           
political or economic systems while working ​within ​them, characterized by its unconventional            
nature (Lipsky 1968, 1145). Summarized in a different fashion by Dalton and van Sickle,              
protest exists on a continuum, seeks to enact social and political change from the ​outside ​of                
traditional institutions, and constitutes unconventional political action but may include some           
illegal acts (Dalton and van Sickle 2005, 3).  
 
Comparing these two differing definitions shows that protest movements may be viewed            
either as a tool for disadvantaged groups to pressure a government, or as an extension of                
political participation used by those who are already active (Dalton and van Sickle 2005, 2). 
 
Although some analyze violent and non-violent protest actions separately, it is clear that they              
are interrelated. Eisinger outlines how protest differs from simple dissent or political violence             4
itself: First, mass mobilization is inherently a ​collective ​action relying on group resources and              
carried out by those directly concerned, not third parties (Eisinger 1973, 13). Protest is also a                
tool for actors to make political demands, while attempting to maximize their impact and              
minimize any incurred costs (Eisinger 1973, 13). Third, protest relies on the ​implicit ​threat of               
violence, rather than the ​explicit ​threat or main intent of political violence (Eisinger 1973, 13).               
It manipulates implied ​fears ​of disorder and violence among opposition, but maintains            
permissibility and popular legitimacy by not acknowledging violence as the central tool            
(Eisinger 1973, 13–14). 
 
The literature offers insights into the mechanism at work - how grievances arise and what               
might affect their development into protest actions. Most protest literature may be grouped             
3 Referred to in this thesis as ​protest​, ​mobilization, protest action​, ​collective action,​ etc. 
4 ​In this analysis I include both violent and non-violent events. 
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into four broad frameworks: ​Grievance and Resource Theories​, ​Political Opportunity          
Structures​, and assorted ​cultural ​explanations. 
 
The focus of early literature, Grievance Theory ​considers protest as a response to unmet              
individual-level needs or a sense of relative deprivation where people feel unequal (Grasso             
and Giugni 2016, 665). These ​grievances form a shared central issue. Proposed resolutions             5
are formulated as ​demands ​expressed by citizens (Klein and Regan 2018, 488). If citizens              
perceive these as unmet by the existing political structure, they act outside of the              
conventional political arena in an effort to challenge it.  
 
Such inequalities may encompass economic, social, cultural, and political dimensions;          
between individuals or horizontally between collective groups ​(Brown and Langer 2010, 29)​.            
Commonly cited grievances include ethnic, religious, political, regional, or economic          
inequality (Collier 2004, 570; Brown and Langer 2010, 28–29). These inequalities may be             
systemic or less systemic, such as a contested election, economic crisis, or regime violence              
that creates “a shared moral outrage” and overcomes problems of collective action (Gandhi             
and Lust-Okar 2009, 415).  
 
The salience of grievances depends on the society, the political system, the economy and              
the social structure (Brown and Langer 2010, 29). When individuals believe protest            
participation helps provide desired public goods; feel a sense of moral obligation; or             
anticipate positive (or negative) social incentives, political involvement will be affected (Opp            
and Roehl 1990, 103). Inequalities that successfully appeal to all of these factors are more               
likely to succeed in forming a mobilized coalition. 
 
But these examples broadly categorize ​potential ​points for grievances in every society.            
Citizens still need the tools and environment with which to successfully mobilize. This is              
where other literature builds on grievance theories in considering these aspects.  
 
Resource Theory expands on relative deprivation, since it requires not only collective            
deprivation, but collective resources (Dalton and van Sickle 2005; Grasso and Giugni 2016;             
McCarthy and Zald 1977). Popular protest is facilitated by a resource base sufficient enough              
for action, which might be found in a strong civil society or socio-economic wealth (Dalton               
and van Sickle 2005, 7; Grasso and Giugni 2016). 
 
McCarthy and Zald observed how this reliance might affect conditions of protest movements             
and differ from grievance-based perspectives in three ways: that supporters might have            
different values and motivations from those most affected by a grievance; that strategies are              
influenced by competition and cooperation rather than simple force or persuasion; and actors             
utilize the environment and infrastructure around them (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1216–17). 
5 ​Defined as a mismatch between “the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are                  
rightfully entitled [...] and the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping.”                 




This leads to the framework of ​Political Opportunity ​theories, in which protest behavior is              
affected by political institutions (Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon 2010, 52; Magaloni and             
Wallace 2008, 8–9; Meyer 2004; Grasso and Giugni 2016). Mobilization requires more than             
just dissatisfaction and resources - it requires structures for adequate opportunity.   6
 
The open or closed nature of the political environment matters: how accessible political             
institutions are affects citizens' opportunities and participation cost (Dalton and van Sickle            
2005, 8; Eisinger 1973; Meyer 2004, 128). State capacity and competence might also affect              
opportunities for protest through creating grievances or promoting democratic political          
engagement (Dalton and van Sickle 2005, 8; Eisinger 1973, 28). 
 
These elements point towards a missing component - the role of the political regime and how                
power is maintained. I explore this further in a later section.  7
 
Theories on ​cultural frameworks highlight a sociological perspective. Primarily in studies of            
protest among democracies, Dalton and Van Sickle summarize literature discussing the role            
of social culture, noting values that promote political participation and challenge authority            
(Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon 2010, 59–60). Historic national culture (such as in France),              
values of modernization (such as post-materialism), and political ideologies at the far-left or             
far-right extremes correspond with greater protest (Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon 2010, 9).             
This perspective is less relevant to my thesis, being more sociological with a largely              
European focus, but is mentioned here for inclusion. 
 
Although they compete in aspects, I consider these theoretical frameworks to be compatible             
perspectives of how protest participation evolves. They are parallelled throughout the           
literature, and explain why certain factors are significant in some instances but not in others.               
They express the view that protest mobilization is shaped more by resources and institutions              
than grievances alone (Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon 2010, 9).  
 
Garrett acknowledges all three frameworks, noting that mobilizing resources, opportunity          
structures, and issue framing are all relevant in transforming grievances into protest (Garrett             
2006, 203–4). Mobilizing structures enable collective action, and include social organizations           
and networks as well as available protest methods (Garrett 2006, 203–4). Opportunity            
structures are environmental, including the accessibility of the political system, attitudes and            
cohesion of regime leadership, and likelihood of state repression (Garrett 2006, 203–4). The             
framing process describes the narrative and context used to justify dissent (Garrett 2006,             
203–4). This mirrors the factors shaping mobilization at the protest-level, and point towards             
the role of the ​political environment.  8
 
6 See: Section 2.3: Regimes. 
7 See: Section 2.3: Regimes. 
8 Defined as a combination of the current political structure, the attitude of the present regime, the                 
unique social structure, and present social stability (Eisinger 1973, 11). 
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Protest behaviour requires more than just dissatisfaction - it requires coordination, and is             
moderated by how national context interacts with individual characteristics (Dalton, Van           
Sickle, and Weldon 2010, 52; Magaloni and Wallace 2008, 8–9). Protest is inherently a              
product of the equilibrium between a regime and their citizens. Actions taken on either side               
are determined not only by the resources of a movement, but the openings, barriers,              
capabilities, and resources of the political system (Eisinger 1973, 11–12). 
 
This relationship introduces problems of collective action and information exchange. The           
literature does an apt job of summarizing these two aspects. ​Mobilization is a collective              
action process: actors must select goals and strategies that increase support, successfully            
engage third parties, and maximize their chances of success in winning concessions (Lipsky             
1968, 1114).  
 
The process of collective action combines the current mobilization level, the perceived            
capacity of the protest movement and opposition, the likely attitude and response(s) to             
demands by the state, and the total level of uncertainty regarding all of these (Klein and                
Regan 2018, 486–87). Scholars note that differences in policy preferences, anticipated           
benefits, and (in)tolerance for violence can create divisions (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009,            
411).  
 
Actors also evaluate expected ​costs​: regime behaviours that impede collective action (Klein            
and Regan 2018, 287). These constitute regime ​coercion​, in contrast with ​co-optation that             
promotes support or cooperation with the regime (Klein and Regan 2018, 287; Gandhi and              
Przeworski 2006; Gerschewski 2013; Guriev and Treisman 2015). Within autocracies,          9
dissent may transform into mobilization when the collective gain from exposure of citizen’s             
sincere preferences outweighs the risks of protest or benefits of cooperation (Magaloni and             
Wallace 2008). Coordination is needed to resolve these cost/benefit equilibriums, which           
connects to the issue of information. 
 
The role of ​information ​in the protest environment includes both direct and indirect signals              
(Garrett 2006; Stein 2016; Goebel 2013). Information is a vital resource for both protestors              
and the incumbent regime. Information enables protest actors to fulfill the ‘collective’            
requirement of collective action, but protest itself acts as a bargaining process to             
communicate information to both sides (Klein and Regan 2018). Since each side would             
prefer to avoid any actions which are too costly, protest is a process of using information to                 
gauge and respond to the expected attitudes of the other side. 
 
Actors on both sides must coordinate with each other in various capacities. They seek to gain                
information about opposition, calculate risk, estimate the likelihood of success, and control            
information that might shape eventual outcomes (Stein 2016; Guriev and Treisman 2015;            
Magaloni and Wallace 2008). Incumbent leaders seek to maintain their rule, and protest             
9 See: Sections 2.3: Regimes and 2.4: Coercion. 
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actors seek to mobilize and win concessions. Because of this, successful coordination is             
needed among actors on either side. 
 
The relative ease or difficulty of information access has a moderating effect on these              
citizen/regime interactions (Stein 2016, 1:1–3). Protest threatens stability because both the           
true size of the supporting coalition as well as that of the opposition are fluid and ultimately                 
unknowable (Gallagher and Hanson 2009, 671). In non-democratic regimes, secrecy and           
uncertainty obscures both the strength and disposition of the leadership and citizens alike             
(Stein 2016, 1:1–3; Schedler 2013). 
 
This lack of reliable information can lead to collective action problems and conflict (Stein              
2016, 1:1–3). Both sides therefore have an interest in obtaining perfect information (Klein and              
Regan 2018): for protestors, accurate knowledge of the regime’s response and capacity; for             
regimes, the attitudes of citizens and support for the incumbent versus any opposition.             
Elements which affect these information asymmetries can alter the advantage of one side             
over the other (Bove and Rivera 2015).  10
 
In sum, protest arises when a shared grievance exists with sufficient opportunity and             
resources to mobilize. The subject of the protest itself (affecting public attitudes), the political              
environment (which influences resources and opportunity), and the information available          
(which is in itself a resource) are all relevant in affecting the choices and behavior of actors.                 
Throughout this thesis, I explore each of these in turn, starting with a specific grievance -                
economic inequality. 
2.2 Economic Inequality 
In connecting mobilization with a grievance, it makes sense to explore economic factors due              
to the salience of the issue, its relationship to resources, and the availability of data.               
Economic inequality may be likely to impact individuals and create dissatisfaction           11
regardless of regime type, and is linked to global protest actions and populist movements              
(Korotayev, Meshcherina, and Shishkina 2018; Rodrik 2018; Korotayev, Bilyuga, and          
Shishkina 2018; Griffin and De Jonge 2014).  
 
Historic highs of anti-government demonstrations, riots, and general strikes have occurred           
after 2010 (Korotayev, Meshcherina, and Shishkina 2018, 336–38). Although triggered by the            
Arab Spring, scholars have connected this destabilising wave with economic inequality, along            
with financial deregulation and technology (Korotayev, Meshcherina, and Shishkina 2018).          
This highlights the relevance of exploring the effects of inequality in a more contemporary              
time frame. 
10 See: Section 2.5: Information and Communication Technology. 
11 Defined as the unequal distribution of wealth, whether between individuals of comparable status or 
throughout a population as a whole (Nagel 1973). I use both ​inequality​ and ​economic inequality​ to 




Particularly, economic inequality has been highlighted in connection with post-1980s          
economic policies (Korotayev, Meshcherina, and Shishkina 2018). But there are limited           
studies of authoritarian regimes during this timeframe, which I address. To compensate for             12
this, conclusions can be drawn from the extant literature. 
 
By focusing on a specific grievance, the literature shows how the different theoretical             
frameworks of mobilization actually apply.  
 
A conflict-focused view corresponds to perspectives of grievance theory - inequality may            
increase political polarization and citizen engagement (Solt 2008, 49–50; 2015, 1314–16).           
Poor economic performance, unemployment, and dissatisfaction with economic conditions         
may drive democratic mobilization and regime transitions (Brancati 2014; Geddes 1999).           
Economic inequality allows citizens to blame the incumbent regime for class-based           
grievances and polarizes citizens (Brancati 2014, 1505–6; Griffin and De Jonge 2014). Some             
note that this may have more to do with ​perceptive ​rather than subjective inequality (Griffin               
and De Jonge 2014; Gimpelson and Treisman 2018; Houle 2018; Østby 2008). Others find              
that increased inequality leads to demobilization, but that ​change in economic circumstances            
may increase mobilization (Kurer et al. 2019). 
 
Inequality has been theorized to underlie movements that are not explicitly economic in             
nature. Rodrik illustrates a mechanism where two cleavages exist within society: elite            
membership based on wealth and power, and non-elite membership based on group            
identities such as ethnicity and religion (Rodrik 2018, 24). This means that political             
movements focused around other factors (such as these group identities) may actually be             
rooted in underlying economic effects (Rodrik 2018). Inequality may then underlie larger            
trends regardless of the event-level focus.  
 
Although economic concerns might create grievances, this does not mean that they generate             
more protest. Within the environment of an autocracy, there is a clear imbalance of power               
favoring the regime elite - identities of wealth and power as conceptualized by Rodrik (Rodrik               
2018). It seems reasonable that increased economic inequality might tip the balance in favor              
of the most influential citizens, and risk demobilizing an already-disadvantaged populace.  
 
Under political opportunity and resource frameworks, economic grievances might not create           
protest (Debs 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Here, mobilization would depend more            
on available economic resources or access to political opportunity (Solt 2008, 49–50; 2015,             
1314–16). Mobilization may be lower among the poorest; who are deprived of economic             
resources and without access to political avenues (Nagel 1973; Gilli 2012; Debs 2010;             
Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).  
 
Houle finds evidence of this in their global analysis. They use similar data to this thesis and                 
12 See: Section 3: Theoretical Framework. 
13 
 
their findings hold when controlling for regime type (Houle 2018). Their results show that              
economic inequality not only destabilizes established democracies, but that inequality leads           
to political exclusion of low and middle-income citizens in autocracies and democracies alike             
(Houle 2018). 
 
Although limited to democracies, Solt provides similar evidence. They find that higher levels             
of income inequality appear to reduce protest participation, overall political discussion, and            
participation in elections among all but the wealthiest citizens (Solt 2015; 2008). Notably, Solt              
finds support only for opportunity-based theories of political protest - grievance and resource             
theories are not supported (Solt 2015). They show that increased inequality leads to lower              
political engagement among poorer individuals, since unequal wealth corresponds to unequal           
resources and ability for political engagement (Solt 2008, 49–50; 2015, 1314–16). If - as              
Rodrik illustrated - wealth and power are synonymous with elites, then greater inequality             
serves only to increase their resources. 
 
These perspectives support theories that economic inequality weakens the         
already-disadvantaged position of non-elite citizens. Greater economic inequality may give          
some incentive to protest for greater resources - but gives the wealthy disproportionate             
motivation and resources to confront challenges to elite status (Haggard and Kaufman 2012,             
495). If income inequality reflects policy preferences among citizens, then inequality in favor             
of the elite reflects an advantage in crafting policy that benefits them (Gandhi and Przeworski               
2006, 18; Houle 2018, 681).  
 
Others theorize a curvilinear relationship for grievance- resource- and opportunity-focused          
perspectives, where mobilization occurs in the middle. Here, mobilization by the poorest            
faces insurmountable obstacles, but the wealthy have plentiful political resources (Dalton and            
van Sickle 2005; Grasso and Giugni 2016; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Acemoglu and             
Robinson 2006). Protest is lowest when these factors are distributed most equally or             
unequally, and highest when imbalanced so that neither side can achieve their desired             
resources (Nagel 1973). But a negative effect is still noted - and any curvilinear relationship               
globally might potentially be skewed due to the inclusion of liberal democracies with higher              
per-capita income. 
 
Collectively, the academic literature provides a wealth of contradictory and often-inconclusive           
evidence. Inequality may decrease protest and political engagement (Solt 2015; 2008), may            
increase conflict and mobilization (Brancati 2014; Korotayev, Meshcherina, and Shishkina          
2018), or might have a curvilinear effect (Korotayev, Bilyuga, and Shishkina 2018; Acemoglu             
and Robinson 2006; Nagel 1973) This is complicated by a lack of literature examining              
inequality among dictatorships, which I later discuss alongside other research gaps. Setting            13
aside these limitations and considering the existing literature, the effect on protest appears to              
be generally negative, but ​observed to be positive only when moderated by certain             
conditions​. 




One possible explanation for this is because of how economic elements are endemically             
linked to the ruling regime itself. Not only are economic grievances the result of specific               
policies and behaviours, but the context in which political protests occur is determined by              
where they occur. As noted in the theoretical frameworks for protest, the actions taken by               
groups and individuals are determined not only by the resources available to their movement,              
but the openings, barriers, capabilities, and resources of the political environment it takes             
place within (Eisinger 1973, 11–12). 
 
Kurer et al. notes how protest may be conditioned by the existing political environment (Kurer               
et al. 2019). They connect this to independent political institutions, and how an active political               
environment may compensate for individual-level demobilization (Kurer et al. 2019). This           
relates directly to the concept of institutional differences, which I discuss in the following              
section. Differences between regime types shape grievances themselves, the protest          
environment, and potential outcomes. 
 
As observed in the next section, Hanson provides evidence of differing inequality outcomes             
across regimes. Inequality should be lower when elites spend greater resources on vertical             
accountability (to the citizens), but repression may be used both in combination or as an               
alternative to higher spending (Hanson 2013, 24). This affects outcomes - within autocracies,             
redistribution which reduces income inequality may reduce domestic terrorism, because it           
addresses the underlying grievances with state institutions (Krieger and Meierrieks 2019,           
135). Such efforts and their outcomes depend on institutional availability dictated by regimes             
- those possessing a wider institutional base require greater depth of support and are likely to                
distribute benefits more widely (Gallagher and Hanson 2009, 668).  
 
In summary, the literature provides mixed evidence for the effects of inequality on protest.              
Frequently it appears to suppress resources and mobilization, but positive relationships are            
observed under certain conditions and when analyzing specific events. Clearly inequality           
relates to the political environment as well. This gives reason to believe that among              
autocracies, it may differ between regimes and their associated political environment, which I             
explore in the following section. 
2.3 Regimes 
Since political protest occurs in relationship to a political ​regime, it is relevant to examine               14
the nature of autocratic regimes and their political environment. Regimes may be ​democratic             
or ​non-democratic. A country is democratic if it refrains from violence in resolving political              15
conflicts, avoids disregarding electoral rules and civil liberties, and chooses executive           
14 I define ​regime ​as a set of formal and informal rules which form the procedural institutions that select 
leadership, determine political access, and are accepted by major political actors (Wilson and Piazza 
2013, 942; Geddes 1999, 116). 
15 Referred to in this thesis as ​autocracies or dictatorships, authoritarian ​or ​non-democratic​, etc. 
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leadership in fair competitive elections or constitutional succession (Wahman, Teorell, and           
Hadenius 2013, 22; Svolik 2012). It ceases to be a democracy when it disregards key               
mechanisms such as electoral rules or civil liberties (Svolik 2012, 16). Non-democratic            
regimes are those whose executive leadership and policies are not chosen in competitive             
and fair direct elections or normal constitutional succession (Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius            
2013, 22). 
 
Autocracies have two distinctive qualities: “the absence of an independent authority that            
would enforce mutual agreements and the ever-present potential for violence” (Svolik 2012,            
16), although dictators may ​choose ​to comply with agreements and show commitment to             
power-sharing (Boix and Svolik 2013, 301). 
 
The regime type itself is a product of historical, geographical, economic, and political             
conditions (Gallagher and Hanson 2009, 667). It reflects decision-making interests which           
determine government policies and behavior (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014, 314–15).           
The literature shows that not all autocracies fit the stereotype of being uniform and repressive               
- among some, arguably democratic institutions exist (Wilson and Piazza 2013, 941; Geddes             
1999; Boix and Svolik 2013; Svolik 2012). However, it also shows that autocratic institutions              
are arbitrary, and differ from democracies in three ways: elections are not certain to force out                
incumbents, legislatures are not truly democratic, and legislative processes can be overruled            
by leaders (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, 22).  
 
Authoritarian regimes balance horizontal pressures of elites against the power of citizens to             
mobilize against them, confronting similar obstacles to democracies (Haggard and Kaufman           
2012, 497; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Teo 2019, 4; Hanson 2013). Autocracies benefit             
from a broader set of tools for coercion, co-option, and control to maintain this power balance                
(Gallagher and Hanson 2009, 667). They use these to maintain power, respond to             
opposition, and encourage the loyalty of their citizens and supporters (Magaloni and Wallace             
2008; Gerschewski 2013; Boix and Svolik 2013; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Svolik 2012).  
 
By examining the nature of co-optation and coercion, the literature shows how differences             
between regime types influence their capacity and use of both to cause different outcomes. 
 
As defined, ​co-optation offers benefits to potential opposition in exchange for their personal             
investment in the political game, mostly via institutions such as parties, legislatures, and             
elections. They can be used to signal credible commitment by the regime (Stein 2016, 1:11),               
offer power-sharing via coalitions (Magaloni and Wallace 2008) and otherwise build support,            
channel political engagement, and defuse rebellion (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, 21).  
 
These offer alternatives to protest for citizens dissatisfied with the regime, providing an             
opportunity (real or perceived) for support and participation by dissenting actors (Frantz and             
Kendall-Taylor 2014, 337; Bove and Rivera 2015, 457). Under sufficiently repressive regimes            
where protest actions would be unlikely to succeed, even ineffective institutions offer            




Political parties and legislatures help reduce conflict within the ruling coalition by raising             
awareness of discontent and negotiating demands; offering an alternative path to violence for             
opposition actors; and providing information about differing demands and preferences (Bove           
and Rivera 2015, 460). Legislatures are an environment where dissent can be expressed             
without appearing as resistance, so compromises and agreements may be achieved (Gandhi            
and Przeworski 2006, 14). Therefore an absence of mobilization may not always represent             
the absence of dissent, but can reflect its co-opting or channeling into other aspects of the                
regime (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). 
 
If tools of co-optation make up one side of a spectrum, the tactics of ​coercion ​discussed in                 
the literature constitute the other. Coercion may be used both to substitute or reinforce              16
co-optation (Hanson 2013; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). Coercion includes violent and           
non-violent forms targeted at groups or individuals - arrest and imprisonment, physical            
abuse, assassinations, political or physical restrictions, surveillance, harassment, or         
censorship (Wilson and Piazza 2013, 943; Bove and Rivera 2015, 457; Gerschewski 2013).             
These impose costs on protestors that discourage collective action. 
 
Guriev and Treisman note that the power of dictators depends in part on their perceived               
competence or lack thereof (Guriev and Treisman 2015, 3). Wintrobe also observes that             
autocracies in fact ​prefer ​to rule on the basis of support - but maintain the use of repression                  
(the “propensity for violence” discussed by Svolik) when they are unlikely to receive it              
(Wintrobe 2005; Svolik 2012). 
 
This echoes a third component - legitimation - conceptualized by Gerschewski. Regimes can             
employ a combination of public legitimation, repression, and co-optation to counter           
destabilization from elite and non-elites who dissent (Gerschewski 2013, 18). Legitimation           
includes not only ideological support, but how well the regime delivers via public goods, the               
economy, and society to gain support of the citizens (Gerschewski 2013, 18–20). 
 
According to Gerschewski, protest represents an absence of specific support among part of             
the population (Gerschewski 2013). To compensate for this weakened legitimacy, regimes           
have the choice of responding with either repression or co-optation. This preference for             
co-optation or coercion depends on their institutional capacity and costs for each (Guriev and              
Treisman 2015, 3–4; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). Which options are available to the             
regime depend on its composition (Wilson and Piazza 2013, 942). The literature suggests             
that regimes may use legitimation to build popular support from citizens, repression to restrict              
opposition, and co-optation to encourage cohesion and elite support (Gerschewski 2013, 28).  
 
This leads to the subject of how regimes are categorized. They differ in their bases of                
support, policy-making processes, executive succession, and behavior when interacting with          
16 I explore coercion separately in the following section. 
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their citizens and opponents - and may be categorized accordingly (Geddes 1999, 121).  
 
Here the literature establishes some categories and associated qualities: 
 
Monarchies ​are led by royal lineage following accepted practice or the constitution (Hadenius             
and Teorell 2007, 146; Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013, 25). This would include             
Persian Gulf states, for instance, but not Sweden. They have strong co-optive power, but              
often rely more on personal connections than party membership (Gandhi and Lust-Okar            
2009, 409). Monarchies may have higher feelings of citizen loyalty; and engage in greater              
rent-sharing due to higher-than-average wealth (Magaloni and Wallace 2008, 16; Gandhi and            
Lust-Okar 2009, 413; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, 20). Hanson cautions that monarchies            
may concentrate resources at the top and lack deeper societal linkages found in other              
regimes (such as multiparty systems) (Hanson 2013, 13).  
 
Military ​regimes rule through use of military force, directly or via civilian leadership (Hadenius              
and Teorell 2007, 146). This does not include freely-elected executives with a military             
background (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 146). The literature considers them the most            
unstable of regime types, prone to inter-elite division (Wilson and Piazza 2013, 945; Ulfelder              
2005, 318–19). They are less capable of co-opting due to having shallow institutions, often              
lacking parties or a working legislature, and rely more upon military membership and the              
threat of violence (Svolik 2012, 123–27; Wilson and Piazza 2013, 945). They are more likely               
to favor coercion, lacking resources for co-optation but possessing the military as a tool .               
Hanson again differs here, observing that repression may be cheaper for military regimes but              
they still require internal unity and some popular legitimacy (Hanson 2013, 14). 
 
Electoral regimes which have popular elections for parliament or executive office are            
differentiated into three types: ​no-party​, ​one-party​, and ​multiparty ​regimes.  
 
No-party ​regimes are extremely rare, and may hold elections but prohibit political parties             
(although multiple candidates may still exist) (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 147; Wahman,            
Teorell, and Hadenius 2013, 26). 
 
One-party ​regimes prohibit all parties except for the incumbent from participating in elections             
(Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 147; Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013, 26). They may             
allow non-party candidates or non-independent ‘satellite’ parties to exist (Hadenius and           
Teorell 2007, 147). They are less limited by bureaucracy and may use strategies of both               
coercion and co-optation - but only to a point, since they often lack independent political               
organizations and multiple parties (Wilson and Piazza 2013, 945; Magaloni and Wallace            
2008, 14). They enable greater popular participation for citizens while ensuring a dominant             
position for the incumbent regime (Svolik 2012, 193; Geddes 1999). Some note that dissent              
may be affected by their lack of political diversity, corresponding to limited political opposition              
and poor regime responsiveness (Magaloni and Wallace 2008, 14).  
 
Multiparty ​(or ​Limited Multiparty​) regimes regularly engage in presidential or parliamentary           
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elections which include opposition or independent candidates (Hadenius and Teorell 2007,           
147; Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013, 26). While the elections may not be fully free and                
fair, they still provide an element of competition between individual candidates and their             
opposition (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 147; Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013, 27).            
Protests may be more common because political organizations and opposition parties mean            
elites are more responsive to the loyalty of protestors (Magaloni and Wallace 2008, 14–15).  
 
So why is regime type important, and how is protest affected by their structure? The answer                
is because their different structures affect capacities for co-optation and coercion, and thus             
different outcomes. This is supported throughout the literature. 
 
Hanson illustrates how regime institutions both reflect pressure from citizens and elites, and             
determine the capacity and preference for co-optation or coercion (Hanson 2013; Gallagher            
and Hanson 2009). Redistributive outcomes - and thus economic inequality - are determined             
by whether a regime focuses on co-optation that responds to horizontal pressures from elites              
or vertical pressures from the public (Hanson 2013, 7). Hanson shows that inequality levels              
are lower among regimes that spend resources to strengthen vertical accountability rather            
than horizontal (Hanson 2013, 24). Institutional characteristics - and regime categories - are             
directly connected to the policies that determine economic inequality levels (Hanson 2013).            
Teo provides further evidence that electoral competition, party ideology, and party           
institutionalization contribute to differing inequality between regime types (Teo 2019). 
 
Analyzing terrorism - itself a form of political dissent - Wilson and Piazza present similar               
evidence. Tools available to regimes are endemic to the type of regime, it’s internal structure,               
and bases of support (Wilson and Piazza 2013, 942). They conclude that not only is the                
combination of co-optation and coercion linked with terrorism, but ​that regime type itself             
strongly explains different levels of terrorist activity across regimes. ​Regime type categories            
are proxies for the capacity and use of coercion or co-optation (Wilson and Piazza 2013,               
952–53).  
 
Examining repression, Davenport finds similar significance (Davenport 2007b). One-party         
regimes are consistently less likely to engage in violent or non-violent repression (Davenport             
2007b). This is explained by one-party regimes having co-optive institutions that offer            
alternatives to repression via involving citizens politically. Military regimes are found to            
respect civil liberties more, but commit more violent repression - due to the pre-existing              
reliance on the military as noted by Svolik (Davenport 2007b; Svolik 2012). This highlights              
how - unlike co-optation - coercion is not limited by the absence of institutions, but may                





In addition to these examples, there are numerous other precedents analyzing autocracies            
across regime type categories. But this remains a prominent gap in the research in my               17
view, which I discuss later.  18
 
In summary, the literature supplies categories for regimes, and illustrates differing capacities            
for coercion or co-optation. From this perspective regime-type differences transfer from           
macro-level institutions and policies, to create observable outcomes. These outcomes can           
influence what grievances are produced, to what degree, and affect the cost/benefit analysis             
for both the incumbent regime and opposition. In turn, this can influence the levels of protest                
among regimes. The literature offers examples to illustrate this complex issue, providing            
endless perspectives for examination. 
2.4 Coercion 
The political environment that protests occur within provides only one piece of the puzzle.              
While the tools available for co-optation depend largely on the institutions and structures             
present, coercion offers a wide range of alternatives to complement or replace co-optation. 
 
The capacity for co-option for autocracies may be limited by their institutions (or lack thereof)               
that enable it; in contrast the use of repression is constrained by their presence instead. For                
more democratic countries, elections, veto players, and constraints on executives may limit            
the use of coercion (Wilson and Piazza 2013, 942).  
 
But this is largely because it’s the least preferable option - not because it is unavailable. As                 
noted, autocracies lack an independent authority to enforce agreements and possess an            
ever-present potential for violence (Svolik 2012, 16). Gandhi and Lust-Okar remark that            
regimes may prefer co-optation to avoid the risk of public outrage further mobilizing             
opposition (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 414). Research by Guriev and Treisman finds that             
strategies of co-optation, propaganda, and censorship are the most preferred - to the degree              
made possible by the regime’s institutions (Guriev and Treisman 2015, 3–4). When            
successfully employed, they make targeted repression unnecessary. Their findings also note           
that violent coercion is a measure of last resort that signals vulnerability and a lack of                
alternatives (Guriev and Treisman 2015, 4).  
 
This makes it arguably more independent of institutions than co-optation - and it is frequently               
measured as such. For instance, in evaluating how autocracies employ coercion, Frantz and             
Kendall operationalize measurements of empowerment rights (non-violent coercion) and         
physical integrity rights (violent coercion) by using two independent indexes (Frantz and            
17 See: Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Hanson 2013; Wilson and Piazza 2013; Geddes 1999; Geddes,               
Wright, and Frantz 2014; Svolik 2012; Gallagher and Hanson 2009; Hadenius and Teorell 2007;              
Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013 among others. 





Much of the literature argues for a negative relationship. Svolik finds that existing inequality              
encourages the use of repression in a dictatorship to prevent poorer classes from dominating              
the incumbent elite (Svolik 2012). Gerschewski observes that coercion inherently suppresses           
protest (Gerschewski 2013) and studies including democracies note that state repression           
may limit protest even in relatively open environments (Carey 2006, 8–9). Notably, empirical             
findings suggest that while coercion suppresses protest, not all regime types are equally             
effective (Ortiz 2013). 
 
Others suggest a reciprocal relationship. Moore finds that when the state responds to violent              
protests with violent coercion, dissidents may substitute nonviolent methods, and when the            
state responds to nonviolent dissent with violent coercion, protests may increase their use of              
violence (Moore 1998). This is supported by Carey, who observes a reciprocal relationship,             
between repression and protest (Carey 2006, 8). Another such cross-national study found            
that coercion reduced the chances of future mobilization, but that protest increased the             
likelihood for coercion (Ortiz 2013). 
 
Similarly, some find an inverted or curvilinear relationship - Opp and Roehl note that              
increasing repression decreases protest participation by increasing costs; that increased          
repression adds positive incentives to protesting; and that these incentives decrease after a             
certain point (Opp and Roehl 1990). This is partially supported by Muller, who found support               
for an inverted U-curve relationship between political violence and regime coercion, along            
with a positive relationship of political violence and economic inequality (Muller 1985). 
 
Other literature suggests mixed effects may be possible. Examining terrorism among           
authoritarian regimes, Wilson & Piazza found that repression may increase the costs of             
collective action against the state and the ideological benefits of resistance, but harms the              
economy (creating grievances) and lowers the opportunity cost for dissent (Wilson and            
Piazza 2013, 943). 
 
One reason for these mixed results may be the relative gap in the literature that coercion                
represents. Not only is the relationship of coercion and protest greatly under-researched, but             
comparisons of coercion among autocracies is limited.  19
 
In summary, the literature appears contradictory and divided on the effects of coercion,             
although a negative relationship seems most compelling when considering the inherent           
power imbalance within autocracies. Literature focusing on repressive regimes finds a lack of             
understanding of when regimes can deter protest, when repression is effective, and when it              
may increase violence (Pierskalla 2010, 135). Even in studies of democracies - arguably             
more well-studied than autocracies - whether repression actually reduces dissent and           
mobilization, and under what conditions, is acknowledged to be under-researched          
19 See: Section 3: Theoretical Framework. 
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(Davenport 2007a, 10). This presents another gap in the existing literature that this thesis              
contributes to. 
 
At its core, coercion attempts to collectively influence collective action. But along with the              
effects of coercion, a lack of reliable information for either side to make informed decisions               
can lead to collective action problems (Stein 2016, 1:3). Given the tremendous developments             
of the past 30 years, it is necessary to consider the subject of information technologies.  
2.5 Information and Communication Technology 
Over the past 30 years (in particular the most recent decade) information and communication              
technology (ICT)  has changed how we engage with each other and the world. 20
 
The importance of emerging media and new ICT as it relates to protest movements has only                
recently begun to be addressed in the literature on a cross-national level, beyond             
case-studies of prominent events. ICT poses benefits and drawbacks for both regime            21
leaders and opposition. From a democratic perspective, ICTs have made dictatorship less            
durable by increasing information access along with costs for censorship and co-optation            
(Guriev and Treisman 2015, 5). ICTs serve to increase information access among the public              
but may be used by regimes to consolidate control (Stein 2016; Goebel 2013). 
 
While authoritarian leaders require information to monitor both internal (elite) and external            
(non-elite) threats, citizens require information to determine their level of support or            
opposition to the incumbent (Stein 2016, 1:2–3). ICT implementation offes regimes a choice             
between gaining associated economic benefits (and thereby improved legitimacy), increased          
information, and potential for increased citizen mobilization (Stein 2016, 1:13).  
 
Through protesting, citizens base their choice of actions on their beliefs about perceived             
characteristics of the regime, and communicate this aggregated information to the regime -             
this mechanism is even stronger under increased media freedoms (Casper and Tyson 2014,             
563). This could partially explain why more protest is permitted among some regimes than              
others, as well as why some allow higher levels of media freedom: because it serves to                
alleviate the “Dictator's Dilemma” by providing a collective measurement of citizens’ true            
preferences and allowing the regime to respond accordingly (Wintrobe 2005, 7). 
 
ICT can act as a moderating factor, enabling sharing of information throughout groups and              
loosely-affiliated networks, creating opportunities as well as risks for both regime leaders and             
potential opposition (Stein 2016, 1:3). While they can stimulate the economy and encourage             
20 ​Information and communication technologies​ (ICTs) include technologies such as digital networks, 
satellite systems, cellular phones, traditional telephones, computers, radio, television, email and the 
Internet or World Wide Web (Garrett 2006, 202; Goebel 2013, 385–86). 




democratic freedoms, they also help consolidate authoritarian rule and increase repression           
(Goebel 2013).  
 
They may also reflect the limitations for co-optation and coercion among regimes. For             
instance, if options for co-optation are restricted, regimes can restrict online media as a              
substitute (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 412–13; Guriev and Treisman 2015, 4). If            
co-optation through state resources is unachievable, incumbents can attempt to suppress           
opposition and influence elections by limiting the media and controlling information (Gandhi            
and Lust-Okar 2009, 412–13; Guriev and Treisman 2015, 4). 
 
ICTs have been shown to affect participation levels, mass mobilization itself, and collective             
organization (Garrett 2006, 203–4). ICT has been associated with both increased political            
protest and associated repression (Christensen and Groshek 2019; Stein 2016, 1:30–31). It            
can affect mobilization by lowering participation costs and encouraging unity among           
opposition actors (Garrett 2006, 204–7; Ruijgrok 2017). It can help accelerate and diffuse             
mobilization across a greater geographic distance, increase availability of information, and           
allow new types of mobilization (Garrett 2006, 207–10; Ruijgrok 2017). This may be despite              
obstacles posed by regime censorship. In one anecdote from protests in Belarus, activists             
remarked how encrypted chats serve as a main source of information for activists unable to               
trust state media (Daria Litvinova 2020). Relatedly, ICTs help overcome coordination           
problems by facilitating decentralized and non-hierarchical organizations (Garrett 2006,         
210–12; Ruijgrok 2017).  
 
Not all findings agree, Brancati claims that ICT may have little to no effect on protest activity,                 
and does not make pro-democracy movements more likely to occur (Brancati 2014). They             
find that ICTs may do more to increase the size and longevity of protests, but may not                 
determine their occurrence in the first place (Brancati 2014, 1525). In the absence of such               
technologies, protests would perhaps have been organized through other means and           
occurred anyway (Brancati 2014, 1525). 
 
Others note that ICT can be used by governments for surveillance, censorship, and             
propaganda (Goebel 2013; Guriev and Treisman 2015). It may also increase the regime’s             
ability to monitor elite actors, popular demands, and improve regime responsiveness thereby            
increasing public support (Goebel 2013, 390–400). In other words, to improve what Goebel             
terms “legitimacy-relevant outputs” (Goebel 2013, 400). But - this does not mean that it              
decreases protest. 
 
In their authoritative study of technology and protest within autocracies, Weidmann and Rød             
find that multiple actors simultaneously benefit from ICT, and that control of ICT             
implementation is asymmetrical (favoring the regime) (Weidmann and Rød 2019). They           
observe that city-level Internet penetration is correlated with less frequent protests, but that it              
may sustain protest actions once begun (Weidmann and Rød 2019). This is similar to              
Brancati’s findings (Brancati 2014). They find that while ICT diffuses ​information ​about            
repression, it does not make it more effective (Weidmann and Rød 2019). Finally, they note               
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while digital repression can act as a substitute for traditional coercion, this can backfire by               
significantly increasing protest mobilization once started (Weidmann and Rød 2019).  
 
Others also find positive associations with increased mobilization (Christensen and Groshek           
2019). They highlight the important distinction that while ICT usage may increase both             
protest and repression, it does exactly that - ​increase both​. Although ICT technologies may              
be ​used ​for repression, it does not appear to decrease protest overall. Among autocracies,              
ICT usage showed a positive relationship with anti-government demonstrations - and media            
freedoms were not statistically significant (Christensen and Groshek 2019). This would           
appear to suggest that while not inherently democratic, ICT usage is significant to greater              
protest occurrence. 
 
Importantly, this role of ICT may be strong enough that it may make comparisons before its                
widespread adoption less comparable. If ICT presents a significant moderating factor           
affecting protest and informational mechanisms, findings prior to widespread ICT adoption           
may not be directly comparable to the environment of today. At the very least, it means that                 22
additional research is needed to say for sure. 
 
But in general, the literature strongly suggests that ICT is likely to increase information              
access and increase mobilization by resolving coordination problems. It may affect           
repression, but previous research shows that this appears to be in concert with increased              
protest, not instead of it. 
2.6 Other Factors 
There appear to be strong relationships between protest occurrence and inequality, political            
regimes, and technology, but there remain additional factors to consider. These are            
mentioned in the literature and show sufficient theoretical significance, even if outside of my              
central focus. 
GDP Per Capita 
First, the level of economic wealth in a country should be considered, since the level of                
economic wealth affects how much there is to be distributed as a whole. Insufficient GDP per                
capita may contribute to instability, and some findings point towards an increased increased             
risk of protests and political destabilization until a certain threshold is reached (Korotayev,             
Bilyuga, and Shishkina 2018). 
Natural Resources Rents 
The sources of economic wealth may also be important. Regimes relying on resources like              
oil or minerals have little or no need for cooperation, less need for parties, and may rely more                  
on rent distributions to gain citizen loyalty (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). They show greater              
overall stability - possibly due to a higher quality of life for their citizens (sufficient to deter                 
22 I address this and other research gaps in Section 3: Theoretical Framework. 
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democratization) and resources to buy-off the military to prevent coups (Wright, Frantz, and             
Geddes 2015). This wealth functions as an independent pool of resources for the regime,              
and may correspond to higher coercion, since regimes rely less on revenue from citizens and               
feel less obligation towards them (Hill and Jones 2014). 
Population & Urbanization 
The capacity for mobilization plays a role, since a country with a smaller population will not                
have the ability to have as many or as sizable protests. ​Where ​people live may be important,                 
and urbanization is another potential confounder. Regimes often implement policies that           
benefit citizens living in cities at the expense of those living rurally (Wallace 2013). Cities               
have denser and higher populations and associated communication networks - which can            
magnify grievances and concentrate any mobilization (Wallace 2013, 632). This means that            
denser urban populations have more potential to threaten regime stability compared to            
dispersed rural ones, and so become a priority for regimes. This urban-biased preference             
ultimately leads to concentration instead of expansion, improving short-term stability and           
economic growth at the cost of increased unrest (Wallace 2013, 632–33)​. 
Cultural Diversity 
The composition of society - in particular division along ethnic or cultural lines, may              
potentially affect protest. It may introduce coordination problems that harm mobilization, or            
increase risks of violent unrest due to citizen exclusion and polarized policy preferences             
(Magaloni and Wallace 2008, 24; Bodea, Elbadawi, and Houle 2016). 
Unemployment 
Unemployment is another potentially significant grievance likely to intersect with economic           
inequality. Higher unemployment may increase pre-existing feelings of relative deprivation          
and the likelihood to engage in protest action (Grasso and Giugni 2016, 675). It may also                
prompt individuals to conceptualize it in a more collective way - viewing unemployment as a               
greater political problem rather than an individual one (Grasso and Giugni 2016, 675; Kurer              
et al. 2019, 873). Unemployment among youth especially is linked with increased protest             
participation (Korotayev, Meshcherina, and Shishkina 2018). It may also lower the cost for             
protesting through the desperation and limitations created by joblessness.  
 
In summary, the literature identifies per-capita GDP, rents derived from natural resources,            
the total population and their distribution, cultural fragmentation, and national unemployment           
as potential confounders to consider. This list is not exhaustive, but represents notable             




3. Theoretical Framework 
Throughout the literature, I have identified important elements concerning collective action,           
the political environment, and information exchange. ​To answer my research question I            
examine the ways in which all of these elements may correlate and interact with one another.                
Here, I present my theoretical framework, before discussing my research design and data             
sources. 
 
For this thesis, I choose to limit my analysis to non-democratic regimes between 1990- 2014.               
This serves to focus the scope of my research, and address the urgency of the current                
political climate. By analyzing protest in autocracies, we gain insights into the successes and              
failures of governance, and may craft better policies that encourage democracy. 
 
It also addresses extant gaps in the literature. First, there is still a relatively limited amount of                 
research examining protest events comparatively across non-democratic regime types.         23
Autocracies have often been excluded from analysis, treated as homogenous groups, or            
considered only in comparison with democracies.  
 
For example, Houle mainly makes global comparisons, examining autocracies in only one of             
the publications cited, and there the focus is primarily on democratization (Houle 2018;             
2016a). Gimpelson and Treisman, Griffin and De Jonge, Jo and Choi, and Krieger and              
Meierrieks all rely on global comparisons (Gimpelson and Treisman 2018; Griffin and De             
Jonge 2014; Jo and Choi 2019; Krieger and Meierrieks 2019). Østby’s analysis, although still              
significant, is limited to only 36 countries experiencing civil conflict between 1986–2004            
(Østby 2008). And although I argue that findings by Solt and Kurer et al. are still comparable,                 
they rely on cross-national surveys of democracies (Solt 2015; 2008; Kurer et al. 2019). Of               
those focusing on inequality, Acemoglu and Robinson, Hanson, and Teo were some of the              
few to examine autocracies exclusively (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Hanson 2013; Teo            
2019). Others (such as Guriev and Treisman or Gerschewski) provide excellent models for             
regime behaviour, but do not test this across countries (Guriev and Treisman 2015;             
Gerschewski 2013). 
 
Contrasting autocracies and democracies equally may provide insightful results - for instance            
that democracies are equally as likely as other regime types to employ coercion when faced               
with popular protest, even if particularly unsuccessfully (Carey 2006). But this fails to             
acknowledge the fundamentally undemocratic structure of autocracies, and skews significant          
results in favor of those with the largest number of observations - democracies and relatively               
liberal multi-party democracies. Comparisons that employ a simple binary         
“Dictatorship/Democracy” characterization (such as Gallagher and Hanson) also fall into this           
trap. Not all democracies are equally democratic, but neither are the institutions of Cuba              
particularly comparable to the Saudi monarchy. Analyzing autocracies independently         
23 For instance: Ulfelder 2005; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Stein 2016; Magaloni and Wallace 2008;               
Svolik 2012; Weiner and Federico 2017; Goebel 2013; Gerschewski 2013; Casper and Tyson 2014;              
Guriev and Treisman 2015 among others. 
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provides a better comparison that acknowledges their variations despite their un-democratic           
nature. 
 
Second, much of the most relevant literature is beginning to be outdated. The terminus for               
many studies is in the mid-2000s, and the majority ranges from the 1950s to early 2000s.                
This is problematic because findings may say more about global trends in the past and less                
about the state of affairs today. More importantly, we have no way to detect such skewed                
results without more up-to-date analysis.  
 
Even more contemporary data falls short of incorporating recent events such as the Arab              
Spring movement in 2010. Magaloni and Wallace, for instance, analyze protest and            
authoritarian survival only from 1950 to 2000 (Magaloni and Wallace 2008). Ortiz’s            
discussion on regime/repression interactions is between 1948-1982 (Ortiz 2013). Hanson’s          
contributions range from 1960-2000 and 1965-2005, respectively (Hanson 2013; Gallagher          
and Hanson 2009). Wilson & Piazza also offer a more up-to-date dataset, from 1970-2006              
(Wilson and Piazza 2013). Svolik’s analysis remains authoritative and exhaustive, covering           
1946 to 2008, but ends short of being able to include the wave of protests from 2010                 
onwards (Svolik 2012). 
 
Third, it is possible that globalization and technology have significantly altered the landscape             
in more recent years. Despite the research gap that ICT represents, much previous research              
takes place before or earlier during the growth of ICT and internet technologies worldwide.              
Not only does this present a noticeable gap when considering the widespread use of mobile               
phones in protest actions, but it means that findings from decades ago prior to ICT growth                
may be less comparable with today’s context. 
 
I seek to contribute to each of these gaps by performing a contemporary analysis that builds                
on the existing literature. I ask whether increased inequality creates an observable grievance             
that drives protests across autocracies, as is often theorized? Does it deprive citizens of the               
resources to mobilize? Or is any impact obscured by the effect of other elements? This leads                
to my main research question: 
RQ: How does inequality explain variation in protest levels across autocracies? 
As shown in ​Figure 1​, there is considerable variation in protests among the same countries               
under different regime types. Multi-party regimes are both the most numerous in category             
and in total protests. But military regimes such as Myanmar and Thailand account for a               
noticeable amount, as do monarchies like Bahrain, Eswatini, and Jordan. Apart from China             
(arguably a unique case), the protest occurrence in one-party systems appears           
comparatively low. While some variation is likely explained by changing grievances           
themselves, I explore the idea that any relationship to protest is conditioned by inherent              
differences between regime categories Additionally, I consider the likely impact of other            








In doing so, I consider the impact on protests collectively. I do not address directly the goals                 
of the incumbent regime or their opposition in this thesis, nor the topic of protest events.                
Analyzing these in detail would require focusing on a specific regime at the protest event               
level. Since I am more interested in general trends and variations, I focus instead on larger                
institutional characteristics and motivations. 
 
I choose to examine economic inequality since economic factors are likely to be salient, and               
it has been widely-cited in relation to global protest and populism. I consider it likely to impact                 
individuals and create grievances regardless of regime type. This allows me to explore how              
inequality interacts with the environment of different autocratic regimes. 
 
Examining global inequality among autocracies as shown in ​Figure 2​, there appears to be a               
historical correlation between high inequality and low protest: protest appears to increase as             
inequality decreases over time. The opposite also appears to be true, that when inequality              
has increased, protest has decreased. 
 
This relationship is supported by existing findings from the literature, including research on             
effects among democracies. Based on this, I reach the following hypothesis: 
 
H1. Inequality among autocracies has a negative relationship with mass mobilization​. 
 
After evaluating the evidence, I consider a negative relationship to be most likely.  
 
First, this hypothesis is consistent with resource and opportunity based theories of protest.             
Inequality increases the resources of those at the top which may be used to restrict dissent                
by the poor, while limiting the resources available to dissenting actors. The resources of              
political power and coercive tools possessed by those at the top may have a negative effect                
which overrides any positive relationship that might exist. The resources of those at the              
bottom may be insufficient to enable any real action.  
 
Second, this may be particularly likely among autocracies due to the un-democratic power             
imbalance already present (Schedler 2013). I accept that outliers are possible and expected -              
but these are remarkable because of their irregular occurrence, not in spite of it.  
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FIGURE 2. Protests & Inequality Among Autocracies (Global)
 
Compelling evidence shows that economic inequality leads to increased political inequality. It            
does so by limiting the resources available to poorer citizens, polarizing political preferences,             
and impeding political participation by all except the wealthiest (Houle 2018; Solt 2015;             
2008). That economic inequality increases political inequality was found to hold true by Houle              
even when the level of democracy was controlled for - political rules and policies are skewed                
in favor of the wealthy and powerful (Houle 2018; Solt 2015; 2008). If - as Rodrik and others                  
have illustrated - wealth and power are synonymous with regime elites, then greater             
inequality serves only to increase their strength and resources (Rodrik 2018; Schedler 2013).  
 
And although Solt’s findings concerned democracies, given the differences of power           
structures and political engagement, it seems likely that if such an effect is observed among               
liberal democracies, this mechanism is likely ​stronger ​among autocracies.  
 
Based on this evidence, I choose to take the opposite view of more conflict-focused theories,               
considering the importance of resources for mobilization. I consider this to be especially             
relevant within autocracies which disproportionately favor the elite, despite using          




I accept that there is evidence that the effect of income inequality may have more to do with                  
perceptive ​rather than subjective evaluations of inequality. But this requires sufficient data            24
which is often unreliable or unavailable for many autocracies. In the absence of a good               
variable to measure public perception, a measurement of the relative ​change ​in inequality             
over time might partially capture this. While not the focus of this thesis, I will attempt to                 
acknowledge this by using an alternate variable in a supplemental model.  25
 
Following my first hypothesis, I ask whether or not regime type influences the effect of               
inequality on protest. Does it lead to mobilisation, or suppress political engagement? But             
though inequality levels unquestionably affect individuals, it does not necessarily drive them            
to action. I consider the likely effects on citizen resources and power in an authoritarian               
context. After reviewing the literature, the following hypothesis seems most plausible: 
 
H2 - Regime type interacts with inequality to influence mass mobilization. 
 
As shown in ​Figure 1 and ​Figure 3​, different countries and regime types exhibit substantial               
variation in protest occurrence. ​Figure 3 shows how these protest fluctuations are distributed             
among regime categories across years. Based on previous findings by Hanson and others,             
differences between regime categories may influence the capacity and use of both            
co-optation and coercion, and result in differing outcomes. Existing research also           26
establishes a strong precedent for analyzing these outcomes through the lens of regime             
categories.  27
 
Keeping this in mind, I consider regime categories to function as a proxy for state capacity to                 
engage in coercion or co-optation tactics. The presence and composition of political            
institutions in a regime (such as parties or legislatures) affects incentives for political action              
and provides options for resolution. These differences not only affect macro-level policies            
that generate different outcomes such as inequality, but they determine the structures            
available to those disadvantaged by such policy results. 
 
I have mixed expectations for how this relationship presents among different regime types.             
Structures that co-opt can redirect, absorb, or resolve the political energies and discontent             
that would otherwise lead to protest. Perhaps more likely, co-optation may lead to a positive               
relationship with mobilization, by helping normalize dissent in a manner that leads to higher              
protest. 
24 ​See: Griffin and De Jonge 2014; Gimpelson and Treisman 2018; Houle 2018; Østby 2008. 
25 This variable uses the difference between the yearly GINI coefficient and that of the previous year.                 
These results are provided in Appendix A5. 
26 See: Hanson 2013; Gallagher and Hanson 2009; Wilson and Piazza 2013; Aksoy, Carter, and               
Wright 2012. 
27 See: Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Hanson 2013; Wilson and Piazza 2013; Geddes 1999; Geddes,               
Wright, and Frantz 2014; Svolik 2012; Gallagher and Hanson 2009; Hadenius and Teorell 2007;              
Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013 among many others. 
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FIGURE 3. Protests Across Autocracies by Year & Regime Category 
 
 
Examining ​Figure 4 shows the average level of inequality between regime categories along             
with the average level of protest. Protest appears to differ even for comparable levels of               
GINI; the negative effect theorized in ​H1​ may not uniformly affect regimes. 
 
As Kurer notes, democracies embody certain rights of resistance for citizens to mobilize             
collectively, protest grievances, and replace elite members (Kurer et al. 2019, 867). Although             
this thesis is concerned with non-democracies, it seems reasonable that regimes possessing            
characteristically democratic institutions might embody these qualities, albeit to a lesser           
extent. This, along with coercion, may explain part of the variation shown in ​Figure 4​. 
 
Based on previous findings, protest is likely to be lowest by default in single-party regimes,               
slightly higher among military regimes, and highest among multi-party regimes that possess            
more democratic institutions. There is likely to be limited effect for monarchies, who have              
more wealth and rely less on citizen-derived rents (Hill and Jones 2014; Gandhi and              
Przeworski 2006). This corresponds with existing research on terrorism, redistribution, and           
civil conflict (Hanson 2013; Wilson and Piazza 2013; Fjelde 2010). Inequality would therefore             
compound this relationship.  
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FIGURE 4. Protests & Inequality Among Autocracies
 
 
But my goal is only to investigate a moderating effect of regime types; deeper investigation               
would be needed to explain the specifics of these differences and adequately separate             
causation from correlation for each regime type. 
 
To provide distinction between the many different regime types, I use the categories provided              
by Hadenius, Teorell, and Wahman. I choose this categorization for several reasons.  
 
First, because it focuses on how political power is maintained, and I am examining protest               
which is inherently a challenge to power. It separates regime types according to their              
institutional makeup in a manner consistent with that used in previous research, and captures              
the unique nature of monarchies and multi-party electoral autocracies. Second, because it            
does not focus as much on regime transition and survival, since this is not the focus of my                  
thesis. It is also balanced in its coding decisions, evaluating the fact that regimes may have                
characteristics of more than one type. Finally, this regime type dataset best captures the              
country/year period needed for my analysis when joined with other datasets. 
 
Although there is a risk in attempting to categorize regimes, I argue that it still represents                
qualitative frameworks that capture measurable aspects - the use of Freedom House and             
Polity scores, or hereditary succession, for instance. How well labeled institutions match up             
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in actual practice is a subject that has more to do with country-level performance than               
institutional classification, and would be better addressed in future research. 
 
I am not examining the component of legitimation (as conceptualized by Gerschewski) as an              
independent variable for several reasons. Partly due to the methodological challenges           
acknowledged by Gerschewski - there exists no singular agreed-upon metric for measuring            
legitimacy (Gerschewski 2013). While indicators of government performance exist and are           
reliable, measuring public attitudes is more difficult. For my thesis, this also leads to potential               
issues of collinearity: Gerschewski cites protest data as a potential measurement for popular             
legitimation (or its absence) (Gerschewski 2013, 20). Therefore any independent variable           
capturing the legitimacy of a regime as defined by Gerschewski would risk encompassing my              
main dependent variable. Gerschewski’s research also focused more on regime stability,           
which is not the main focus of this thesis. 
 
Despite this I acknowledge that legitimation plays an important role in any discussion of              
protest. I consider legitimation to be partially represented in my thesis by the concept of               
grievances and protest. But this concept focuses only on the “specific” form of support              
discussed by Gerschewski - whether a regime adequately meets the demands of its citizens              
(Gerschewski 2013, 20). My thesis does not encompass Gerschewski’s concepts of “diffuse”            
legitimation - the longer-term public support for the actual ideologies, claims, or ideals that              
the regime represents (Gerschewski 2013, 20). This thesis primarily assumes differences in            
co-optation and coercion tactics, capturing legitimation only peripherally. 
 
Since co-optation is dependent upon institutions that are arguably captured by regime type, I              
choose to examine coercion separately. Using objective measurements of respect for human            
rights can help to capture and isolate any effects of coercion, while the regime structure itself                
reflects the co-optive institutions present and existing bases of power. 
 
Examining historical trends among autocracies as shown in ​Figure 5​, there appears to be a               
clear correlation between protest occurrence and violence coercion as measured by respect            
for human rights standards. ​Figure A1 shows how this relationship varies between regimes,             28
although it is measured independently from them. 
 
28 See: Appendix A3. 
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FIGURE 5. Protests & Coercion Among Autocracies
 
Based on this and my evaluation of the evidence in the literature, I reach the following                
hypothesis: 
 
H3 - Coercion has a negative relationship with mass mobilization, independent of            
regime type. 
 
At least in the short-term, repression should deter protest through increasing the costs of              
collective action against the state and leveraging the power of the regime. This is supported               
by findings of Svolik, Gerschewski, Carey, and Ortiz (Svolik 2012; Gerschewski 2013; Carey             
2006; Ortiz 2013). 
 
I accept that the literature is mixed in its conclusions about the relationship between coercion               
and protest. There exists strong evidence for a more reciprocal relationship - however this is               
complex and contested (Ortiz 2013; Pierskalla 2010; Hill and Jones 2014). And this is often               
with regards to political violence (Moore 1998; Pierskalla 2010; Carey 2006; Ortiz 2013),             
which is outside the scope of this analysis. 
 
Especially in the context of an authoritarian regime, I theorize that sufficient coercion tends to               
deter mobilization. This is plausible when considering the power of the incumbent regime -              
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their lack of independent accountability and capacity for violence. However, I acknowledge            
that outliers are to be expected, if citizens have a sufficiently strong focal point and unifying                
environment. By accounting for coercion, we can more clearly see when protest is             
suppressed, redirected, or permitted. 
 
I consider this to be regardless of regime type under this model, because measurements of               
coercion are capturing the actual ​use of state repression (via estimated levels of human              
rights), not the capacity of a particular regime. In controlling for coercion separately, I also               
consider it to be the default tactic for authoritarian regimes. This acknowledges Svolik’s view              
of the inherent potential for violence within authoritarian regimes (Svolik 2012), and            
conceptualizes coercion as being less limited than co-optation. Co-optation relies on           
institutions and is limited by their absence, but coercion can be used as complement or               
replacement. Co-optation encourages cooperation, which may revert to the use of control            
when that fails. This is supported by research that conceptualizes coercion as the             
least-preferable and costliest of tactics, but co-optation as only possible to the extent that              
institutions permit (Guriev and Treisman 2015). 
 
While coercion may include both violent and non-violent measures, in my thesis I focus on               
violent repression. This is because specifically nonviolent repression is harder to quantify and             
might require closer event-level analysis - curfews, censorship, etc. could be in response to              
events themselve. Additionally, some measures of non-violent political restrictions are          
already captured by regime type (a lack of political parties, for example). 
 
Since this thesis concerns protest activity over the period of 1990-2014, the literature shows              
it is necessary to consider technology as a moderating factor. This addresses an existing gap               
in the literature, and controls for an important potential confounder. The use of information              
technology may be an extension of the unique political environment of different regime types.              
By including the use of ICTs, I can explore the ways in which the presence and quality of                  
information signals affect protest across regimes, but separate that from the effect of the              
regime institutions themselves. 
 
As shown in ​Figure 6 here and ​Figure A2 in the Appendix, there appears to be a strong                  29
relationship between the average number of protest events per year, and the overall ratio of               
ICT usage among the population. This seems to be more correlated with ICT than the               
population alone. Based on this and the evidence previously summarized in the literature, I              
reach the following hypothesis: 
 
H4 - ICT usage has a positive relationship with mass mobilization independent of             
regime type. 
 
Though the literature points in both directions, this hypothesis seems most supported when             
considering protests among different regime types over time. 
29  See: Appendix A3. 
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FIGURE 6. Protests & ICT Use Among Autocracies
 
Overall, ICTs serve to increase information access, can increase mobilization resolving           
coordination problems, but can be used by regimes to consolidate control (Stein 2016;             
Goebel 2013). Internet penetration has been positively associated with increased protest           
events on average in a given year when compared with democracies (Stein 2016, 1:30–31).              
This relationship holds even when the higher average number of protests under authoritarian             
regimes is controlled for (Stein 2016, 1:30–31). It should be noted that I am examining               
technology as an ​enabling ​factor for protest occurrences, not as a primary cause. 
 
While this thesis cannot be exhaustive, additional moderating factors mentioned in the            
literature such as Gerschewski’s concept of legitimation have been acknowledged, even           
though they are not my central focus. The other elements highlighted as potential             
confounders by the literature I will attempt to control for in my models. 
 
In summary, I believe that economic inequality is likely to have a negative relationship with               
mass mobilization due how it worsens existing political inequality. This is especially plausible             
among autocracies due to an inherent power imbalance favoring the elite. But, protest levels              
may also differ between regime types due to how their institutions enable, redirect, or              
discourage dissent. I additionally consider the effects of ICT and regime coercion. I theorize              
that ICT usage will have a positive relationship with protest, in contrast to negative effects of                
economic inequality and coercion. 
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4. Research Design 
4.1 Data 
To examine the effect of inequality on protest mobilization across regimes, I use data drawn               
from the Authoritarian Regimes Dataset, Latent Human Rights Protection Scores, the Mass            
Mobilization Project, The Standardized World Income Inequality Database, Varieties of          
Democracy, and World Development Indicators datasets. 
 
The Authoritarian Regimes Dataset covers the years of 1972-2014 and includes 195 nations             
(Hadenius, Teorell, and Wahman 2017). This includes all UN member nations (with the             
exception of Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Nauru, and Tuvalu.) (Hadenius,           
Teorell, and Wahman 2017). Former countries and Soviet states are treated as separate             
nations (Hadenius, Teorell, and Wahman 2017). This dataset is chosen for the reasons             
previously outlined - the focus on regime institutions, and the consideration of amalgamated             
regime types. This dataset categorizes regime types by how political power is maintained:             
hereditary succession, the use of military force, and the implementation of popular elections             
(Hadenius, Teorell, and Wahman 2017). 
 
The Latent Human Rights Protection Score dataset is a novel dataset which captures the              
estimated “true” level of repression per country and year, and assumes it to be the result of                 
regime actions (C. J. Fariss 2014, 307). I utilize this dataset since it captures repression in a                 
manner that considers changing standards of accountability over time, and calculates a            
baseline probability for the level of repression to vary over time (C. J. Fariss 2014, 314). This                 
model also accounts for the difference between the estimates of a dynamic model where the               
standard of accountability changes with time, and a constant model where it does not (C. J.                
Fariss 2014). 
 
The Mass Mobilization (MM) Data Project records events where 50 or more protesters             
demonstrate against the government, and covers 162 countries between the years of 1990             
and 2018 (Clark and Regan 2016a). While other protest datasets exist, this dataset appears              
to provide the most complete coverage of both countries and years. It also limits the data to                 
citizen protest against the government, which other datasets did not. 
 
The Standardized World Income Inequality Database combines data from the OECD Income            
Distribution Database, the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean           
generated by CEDLAS and the World Bank, Eurostat, the World Bank’s PovcalNet, the UN              
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, and national statistical offices            
worldwide (Solt 2019). It uses data from the Luxembourg Income Study as a standard              
benchmark, and captures Gini estimates for disposable and market income inequality across            
198 countries between 1960 and present (Solt 2019). This dataset is unique in that it uses                
multiple imputations to capture uncertainty, with values given in a mean-plus-standard-error           
format (Solt 2019). I chose to use this dataset since its stated goal is to maximize                
comparability while providing the most coverage possible for countries over time (Solt 2019).             
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To my knowledge, this dataset coverage is greater than any other dataset for income              
inequality at present.  
 
The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset is the largest democracy-focused dataset in            
the world, and consists of expert-coded data for 202 countries between 1789 and 2018              
(Coppedge et al. 2020b). It measures five aspects of democracy, those being: electoral,             
liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian (‘Home | V-Dem’ 2020). 
 
The Quality of Government Standard Dataset includes country-year data between 1946 and            
2019 (Teorell et al. 2019). The Quality of Government dataset is expert-coded by 30              
researchers, with the goal of providing academic research on the “causes, consequences            
and nature of Good Governance and the Quality of Government (QoG)” (Teorell et al. 2019). 
 
My datasets have been compiled in STATA, and all are presented in country-year panel              
format.  30
4.2 Dependent Variable 
My main dependent variable in this analysis is mass mobilization occurrence. To represent             
this in my analysis, I use data from the Mass Mobilization Project. For this variable, the data                 
covers 162 countries between 1990 and 2014 (Clark and Regan 2016a). The unit of              
observation is the protest-country-year, with protests recorded as individual events within           
each country and year (Clark and Regan 2016a). An event is defined as a gathering that                
involves 50 or more people expressing demands against the government, targeted at the             
state or its policies (Clark and Regan 2016a). Protests targeted at other countries,             
inter-communal demonstrations and community disputes, union action towards specific         
companies, rebel attacks, attacks by organized armed resistance, and political rallies by the             
state are all excluded (Clark and Regan 2016a). 
 
These events are gathered from keyword searches of major world news publications via the              
Lexis-Nexis news database (Clark and Regan 2016a). These are drawn first from the New              
York Times, Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, Times of London, the Jerusalem            
Post (in the Middle East and North Africa), and then from regional media, wire reports, and                
other sources (Clark and Regan 2016a). 
 
I operationalize mass mobilization as the number of protests events per country-year. Since             
the dataset was originally coded at the protest-country-year level, I create the variable             
Protest ​by summarizing the number of recorded protest events per year for each country              
code, as a continuous variable ranging from 0 to infinity. 
 
To provide robustness, I replicate my models using an alternate data source for my              
dependent variable. I employ the ​Democratic Mobilization ​variable from the V-Dem           
30 My STATA .do file is available upon request. 
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Dataset. This variable is available for 1900-2019, but restricted to 1990- 2014 for comparison              
in my model. This variable answers the question: “In this year, how frequent and large have                
events of mass mobilization for pro-democratic aims been?” (Coppedge et al. 2020a, 214).             
Here, events are defined as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins to promote or protect             
democratic institutions and principles or civil liberties (Coppedge et al. 2020a, 214). Possible             
values include 0 for nearly no events; 1 for several small-scale events; 2 for many               
small-scale events; 3 for several large-scale and small-scale events, and 4 for many large              
and small-scale events (Coppedge et al. 2020a, 214). This variable as used in STATA              
represents model estimates and can be treated as quasi-continuous. 
4.3 Independent Variables 
For this analysis, my independent variables are the regime type, post-transfer economic            
inequality, coercion, ICT usage, economic wealth, natural resources, overall mobilization          
capacity, urbanization, cultural fragmentation, and national employment level. 
 
First, in order to operationalize economic inequality, I use the mean-plus-standard-error           
estimates from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) for disposable           
income. This represents a post-tax, post-transfer income derived from the sum of an             
estimated households income and government benefits minus direct taxes (‘The SWIID           
Source Data · Frederick Solt’ 2017). I use this estimate since I consider the              
post-redistribution level of inequality to be important, since redistribution is a unique result of              
regime policies. This maximizes coverage, since disposable income estimates are described           
as more common than other definitions (‘The SWIID Source Data · Frederick Solt’ 2017).              
This variable is given as ​GINI (Disposable)​, where a value of 0 represents complete              
equality, and 1 or 100% represents maximum inequality (Bellù and Liberati 2006). Countries             
lacking country-year observations include interpolated values to fill in gaps (‘The SWIID            
Source Data · Frederick Solt’ 2017). 
 
While not the primary focus of this thesis, I consider that the ​relative ​change in inequality                
over time could correlate with protest outcomes. I will provide an additional model which              
attempts to account for this element by calculating the difference between the yearly GINI              
coefficient and that of the previous year. I consider that this might capture a degree of the                 
macro-level changes that might affect individual-level perceptions. I theorize that changes           
large enough to be detectable on a measured country-year level are likely to correspond to               
greater impacts at the micro-level. These results may be found​ ​in the Appendix.  31
 
To supply regime type categories, I use the The Authoritarian Regimes Dataset. This dataset              
categorizes regime types according to how political power is maintained: hereditary           
succession, the use of military force, and the implementation of popular elections (Hadenius,             
Teorell, and Wahman 2017). I consider this categorization suitable since I am examining             
citizen protest and challenges to power. I choose to primarily rely upon the ​Regime Type               
31 Appendix A4, ​Table A1​. 
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(Collapsed) ​variable to categorize regime types, given the limited observations of my data             
and the need to remain within the scope of my thesis.  
 
To incorporate coercion by regimes independent of regime type, I use the ​Human Rights              
Protection Score variable ​from the Human Rights Protection Scores dataset. This variable            
captures the mean estimate plus standard error for a score representing protection of             
physical integrity rights. This variable is unique in that it captures repression in a manner that                
considers changing standards of accountability over time along with the differences between            
a constant and dynamic model (C. J. Fariss 2014, 314). This model also incorporates a               
baseline probability for the level of repression to vary over time (C. J. Fariss 2014). I include                 
this separately since it captures objective measurements which may help separate the effect             
of repression on protest from the institutional environment of the regime. This should allow              
me to control for coercion, and examine the importance of the regime environment on protest               
mobilization. This only captures violent coercion, for the reasons previously given. 
 
Information Dissemination is operationalized through two measures from World Development          
Indicators data. Here I use ​Mobile Cellular Subscriptions ​which captures the aggregate            
number of mobile cellular subscriptions within a country (The World Bank 2020). To make              
this variable more comparable, I transform it from an aggregation of individuals into a              
percentage of the total population, dividing by the yearly population total and multiplying it by               
one hundred. This means that this represents the total number of cellular subscriptions in              
relationship to the population, effectively the ​density of cellular device subscriptions. (E.g. the             
maximum value observed is 205.91% for Kuwait in 2014). 
 
Mobile cellular subscriptions are defined as any mobile telephone service using cellular            
technology, and includes all mobile cellular subscriptions with voice communications (The           
World Bank 2020). It is derived from national administrative data where available and             
otherwise through data from telecommunications operators and market research (The World           
Bank 2020).  
 
While different regimes can choose to address dilemmas of information by allowing,            
managing, or restricting ICT technology (Goebel 2013), I choose not to use an interaction              
term for this variable. This is because I consider it to apply equally, independent of regime                
type, since it represents only the usage among the population. I also choose not to use the                 
variable available for internet usage, since it has fewer observations and using both would              
likely cause problems of collinearity. 
4.4 Control Variables 
Here I include other variables noted as potential confounders. Although not exhaustive, they             
represent some of the most commonly cited elements from the literature.  
 
To control for the economic resources of a country, I include a variable for economic wealth.                
This is operationalized as Gross Domestic Product via the ​GDP Per Capita variable. Derived              
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from the V-Dem dataset, it represents estimated GDP per-capita, transformed by the natural             
logarithm (Coppedge et al. 2020a). 
 
To control for Natural Resource Rents which might affect coercion and co-optation by             
providing an independent income source, I use the variable ​Total Natural Resources Rents             
This variable is from World Bank data, and includes total natural resources rents including oil,               
natural gas, coal , minerals, and forest resources as a percentage of GDP (The World Bank                
2020). 
 
The capacity for mobilization is controlled for by including the population of a country as the                
variable ​Population​. ​This is a continuous variable representing the total population originally            
from World Bank data, but used from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al. 2020a, 342). 
 
Since urbanization might affect mobilization, I control for people living in urban areas with the               
variable ​Urban Population​, drawn from World Bank data. It is calculated via estimates from              
the World Bank and the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects, and captures the             
percentage of the total population living in urban areas (The World Bank 2020). 
 
The variable ​Cultural Diversity ​accounts for cultural fragmentation. This variable captures           
the probability that two people in a given country will belong to different ethnic groups, and                
incorporates a cultural element based on languages spoken between groups (Teorell et al.             
2019, 275). The variable ranges from 0 for perfectly homogeneous to 1 for highly              
fragmented, and values are assumed to be constant for all years (Teorell et al. 2019, 275). 
 
Finally, I consider unemployment as a factor which might affect inequality and the cost for               
protest actions. I control for this with the variable ​Unemployment​, the percentage of the total               
national labor force that is currently unemployed but seeking employment (The World Bank             
2020). I use the estimate from the International Labour Organization included in World Bank              
data, since it provides superior coverage for the maximum country-years. 
4.5 Research Method 
My research data is limited to autocracies between 1990 and 2014. Since            
time-series–cross-section (TSCS) data involves repeated observations of a set of units over            
time, the resulting data often has contemporaneous correlations and heteroskedasticity          
among units (Bailey and Katz 2011, 1). This causes incorrect standard errors when using              
standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to estimate results. Panel-corrected          
standard errors (PCSE) are suggested by the literature as one method to remedy this              
problem and improve the reliability of estimates from TSCS data (Bailey and Katz 2011).  
 
For my research method, I use linear regression with panel-corrected standard errors, and a              
lagged dependent variable. I use the ​xtpcse STATA command, which estimates results for             
linear TSCS models. It also accounts for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation across           
panels when calculating standard errors and variance–covariance estimates (StataCorp         
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2019, 362). I use the ​pairwise option to include all available observations with nonmissing              
pairs since there are gaps in the data (StataCorp 2019, 362). My panel variable is the                
Correlates of War country code. 
 
My dependent variable for each model has a lead of +1 year. This effectively regresses the                
dependent variable observed in one year against lagged independent variables (from the            
previous year), in order to estimate correlation across time. I also include the non-lead              
version of the dependent variable to contrast the level of protest for the past year against the                 
current level. The panel data set is considered to be unbalanced, as there are not               
observations for each country-pair for all years. 
 
A complete list of summary statistics and countries included in my dataset may be found in                
the Appendix, along with a table of my model variables, associated concepts, and STATA              
variable names.  32
 
I include five different models to test my hypotheses, shown in ​Table 1​. The first model only                 
examines the relationship of mass mobilization with all other independent variables including            
relevant controls. The second through fifth model also examines the effect of inequality on              
mass mobilization when inequality is interacted with regime type categories.  
 
To strengthen any findings, I replicate my regime type models using an alternate dependent              
variable. Taken from the V-Dem Dataset, the variable ​Democratic Mobilization represents           33
the level of mobilization for pro-democratic causes within a country-year. This also            
incorporates measurements of event scale which are absent in my main dependent variable.            
This adds additional robustness and reduces any likelihood that my results are a problem               34
of measurement. The added ​correlation(psar1) specification was used for this variable, to            
control for autocorrelation found.  
32 See: Appendix A1 & A2. 
33 Results provided in Appendix A5, ​Table A2​. 
34 See: Section 5.4 Limitations and Future Research. 
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5. Results and Analysis 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
I test 3 hypotheses in my empirical analysis, examining the relationship of protest to              
inequality in general and across autocratic regime types. I also consider the potential effect of               
coercion and ICT usage independent of regime category.  
 
These results are provided in ​Table 1​. In Model 1, I am interested in examining trends and                 
relationships across all country-years. 1,146 observations are included across 85 countries.           
For Models 2-5, I include regime type category dummy variables along with an interaction              
term. This is intended to estimate the main effect and interaction of regime type categories               
with GINI, since the first model does not capture the regime type interactions theorized. All               
possible observations across country-years are still included in this model (and in the             
versions using alternative data). That is, no model tests only observations from that regime              
category. Rather, it tests the relationship of 1) the regime type itself, and 2) the interaction of                 
that regime type with GINI, when all else is considered equal. The relationship of the               
remaining independent variables are estimated without regard to regime type. 
 
Despite my expectations, GINI alone shows no statistically significant relationship with           
protest events across countries for any model. Nor do the interactions of regime type with               
GINI hold any statistical significance. The only regime type found to be statistically significant              
(p<0.05) in my main models is multi-party regimes, with a main effect coefficient of 4.119. 
 
Coercion is shown to be significant (p<0.05), and has the opposite of the expected sign. As                
the respect for physical integrity increases by one unit, average protest events decrease             
slightly, with a coefficient ranging from -0.607 to -0.855. Across all models, lower protest is               
correlated with less violent coercion, not greater.  35
 
Mobile device usage is significant (p<0.05) across all models, with coefficients ranging from             
0.0239 to 0.0270. This means that as the ratio of mobile devices increases by 1%, estimated                
protest increases by 2.39% - 2.7%. 
 
Of my control variables, population was found to be significant in all models and showed a                
weakly positive relationship for each individual. This can be understood as 0.0029 - 0.00417              
higher protest events per 1 million people. The others were not found to be significant, but                
despite this consider them important for inclusion as potential confounders. 
  
35 See: Section 5.3 Discussion of Findings. 
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Table 1. ​Models 1-5  (Main Results, Mass Mobilization Project Data) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Protest (Sum) (Lagged)  0.376***  0.372***  0.374***  0.363***  0.358*** 
  (0.104)  (0.104)  (0.103)  (0.104)  (0.103) 
Disposable GINI  -0.0506  -0.0562  -0.0489  -0.0682*  0.00224 
  (0.0321)  (0.0343)  (0.0332)  (0.0383)  (0.0256) 
Monarchy    -3.757       
    (3.994)       
Monarchy # Disposable GINI    0.0754       
    (0.0832)       
Military Regime      0.0580     
      (2.202)     
Military # Disposable GINI      -0.0179     
      (0.0489)     
One-Party Regime        -4.510   
        (3.294)   
One-Party # Disposable GINI        0.0741   
        (0.0818)   
Multi-Party Regime          4.119** 
          (2.033) 
Multi-Party # Disposable GINI          -0.0750 
          (0.0459) 
Human Rights Protection Score  -0.771***  -0.790***  -0.855***  -0.607***  -0.796*** 
  (0.176)  (0.175)  (0.170)  (0.183)  (0.174) 
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (% of Pop.) 0.0263***  0.0270***  0.0265***  0.0239***  0.0254*** 
  (0.00663)  (0.00649)  (0.00667)  (0.00659)  (0.00669) 
GDP Per Capita (Logged, Base 10)  0.0206  -0.0625  0.0103  0.143  0.0800 
  (0.137)  (0.156)  (0.131)  (0.132)  (0.127) 
Total Natural Resources Rents (% of 
GDP) 
-0.0199  -0.0221  -0.0177  -0.0119  -0.0123 
  (0.0146)  (0.0162)  (0.0150)  (0.0149)  (0.0146) 
Population (Total)  3.01e-09***  3.00e-09***  2.90e-09**  4.17e-09***  3.69e-09*** 
  (1.15e-09)  (1.15e-09)  (1.15e-09)  (1.39e-09)  (1.21e-09) 
Urban Population (% of Pop.)  -0.00779  -0.00357  -0.00864  -0.0154*  -0.0117 
  (0.00739)  (0.0104)  (0.00771)  (0.00921)  (0.00801) 
Cultural Diversity  -0.117  -0.167  -0.105  -0.583  -0.507 
  (0.717)  (0.710)  (0.712)  (0.860)  (0.807) 
Unemployment, Total (% of Labor Force)0.00855  0.00819  0.00774  -0.00439  0.00316 
  (0.0126)  (0.0139)  (0.0130)  (0.0149)  (0.0141) 
Constant  3.156  3.921  3.225  3.686  0.0487 
  (2.301)  (2.529)  (2.285)  (2.479)  (1.626) 
Observations  1,146  1,146  1,146  1,146  1,146 
R-squared  0.193  0.193  0.194  0.198  0.200 
Number of Countries (COWcode)  85  85  85  85  85 
Standard errors in parentheses           





The alternative set of models substituting V-Dem data for my dependent variable provides             36
additional results, but lowers the total observations to 881 from 1146 and countries observed              
to 63 from 85. I acknowledge that fewer countries being included is especially likely to               
influence results of the regime type interactions along with my other variables. 
 
Mobile device usage was again found significant (p<0.01) but showed a much weaker             
positive relationship, with coefficients ranging from 0.00147 to 0.00199 for all models. 
 
Multi-party regimes, though significant in my models using MM data, are not found significant              
when examining V-Dem data. Significance (p<0.01) of one-party regimes was found, with a             
coefficient of -2.168, suggesting a slightly lower correlation of protest scale and frequency for              
this regime category. Significance (p<0.01) for the interaction of GINI with one-party regimes             
was found (not present in my MM model results) showing a positive relationship of 0.0552               
higher protest for each unit of GINI when all else is considered equal. 
 
Along with Population, Urban Population and Cultural Diversity were found to be significant             
control variables for this set of models. Cultural Diversity was significant in all models, and               
Urban Population was found to be significant in all models except for Model 5. Both show a                 
positive relationship with mobilization for democracy. Cultural Diversity shows an increase in            
democratic mobilization ranging from 0.267 to 0.306 as cultural fragmentation increases.           
Urban Population shows a slightly weaker relationship, increasing democratic mobilization          
between 0.00249 and 0.00333 for each percent of the total population living in an urban area. 
 
The alternative models using a measurement of yearly GINI difference gives results largely             37
consistent with my main models, with a few notable differences. Significant results (p<0.05             
and p<0.01 respectively) are found for GINI difference when the interaction terms and main              
effects are included for monarchies and multi-party regimes. The sign is negative for both,              
and indicates a decrease in protest for an increase in GINI. Interestingly, the interaction of               
GINI and regime type is significant (p<0.01) for one-party and multi-party regimes. These             
show opposite effects, a negative relationship of -5.503 lower protest (one-party) and a             
positive relationship of 4.337 higher protest (multi-party) for each unit increase of GINI. 
 
Overall, the expected effects for GINI are not reliably present in my results. Among regime               
types, although one-party and multi-party regimes partly show the expected relationships,           
this is not consistent across different models. Deeper investigation of party-based regime            
types is one potential avenue for future investigation.  38
5.2 Diagnostic Notes & Robustness Checks 
Since I am using panel data, I assume that heteroskedasticity is likely since a wide variation                
between the largest and smallest observed values is expected. As mentioned, using panel             
36 These results are provided in Appendix A5 ​Table A2​. 
37 These results are provided in Appendix A4 ​Table A1​. 
38 See: Section 5.4 Limitations and Future Research. 
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corrected standard errors (PCSEs) accounts for heteroskedasticity across panels in my           
resulting estimates.  
 
Tests using the ​sktest ​command in STATA were performed to check for normality based on               
skewness and kurtosis. Tests for normality using normal quantile plots and standardised            
normal probability (Q-Q) plots were also performed for all variables. Some abnormalities            39
were noted, but adequately correcting and examining these would require additional work. 
  
A Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data showed a significant result for first-order              
autocorrelation in the model using the V-Dem dataset, but not the MM Dataset. The              
correlation(psar1)​ specification was used for the V-Dem dependent​ ​variable.  
 
A CD-test was performed using both dependent variables and showed some cross-sectional            
dependence. However, it is unclear to me if this test is valid when taking into account the                 
large number of panel units ignored in this test (since those with fewer than three joint                
observations are automatically dropped). Additionally, a Modified Wald statistic test showed           
heteroskedasticity in both models. I consider that using panel corrected standard errors is             
likely to compensate for these, and that further diagnostics would require additional time. 
 
To provide checks for robustness, I replicated my models using different estimation            
commands. These results of these are provided in the Appendix. These include: a panel              40
corrected standard errors model with added panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation structure          
(​xtpcse​); a feasible generalized least squares model with fixed effects and panel-specific            
AR1 autocorrelation structure (​xtgls​); standard panel data regression with fixed effects and            
standard errors clustered by country (to account for residual autocorrelation) (​xtreg​), and a             
conditional fixed-effects overdispersion model (​xtnbreg​). The panel-specific AR1 option         
specifies that any autocorrelation present is likely to be specific to each panel, rather than               
shared across all observations. This accounts for some expected autocorrelation for protest.  
 
The results of the ​panel corrected standard errors model and the feasible generalized least              
squares model with fixed effects are comparable to my main results, with some differences.              
They find additional significance for GINI alone and consistent significance for one-party            
regimes in addition to multi-party regimes as in my main model. In one, monarchies are also                
significant. These relationships were not present in my main results, and further testing would              
be required to determine the cause. These also differ from my main results in that most                
relationships appear to be stronger overall. As an example the coefficient for the main effects               
of multiparty regimes is 7.323 and 8.193, compared to 4.119 in my main model. This               
increases confidence in my results being reliable - if conservatively underestimated. 
 
The standard panel data regression with fixed effects and standard errors clustered by             
country gave extremely different results, with only population significant. This is possibly due             
39 See: Appendix A7. 
40 See: Appendix A6. 
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to assumptions (as I understand them) of structure to the errors being present (such as               
heteroskedasticity) when using the ​xtgls command; these assumptions are not present in            
using ​xtreg​ for standard panel data regression. 
 
The conditional fixed-effects overdispersion model using ​xtnbreg also produced differing          
results. GINI alone is significant in all except Model 5, monarchies significant and showing a               
negative relationship, coercion ​not ​significant, but ICT still significant and positive. 
 
Plotting the estimation residuals for my main results - though desirable - was found to not be                 
possible when using the ​xtpcse estimation command, and online searches showed other            
researchers encountering the same problem. 
 
Additional significant results were observed in my models during initial testing stages,            
particularly among one-party Regimes. However, once I adjusted the variables for Urban            
Population and Mobile Cellular Subscriptions to reflect their percentage of the total            
population, these results disappeared entirely. This suggests that any significance found may            
have been outweighed by the effects of those independent variables. 
 
As noted, using alternative methods and sources of data produced some differing results.             
While any further testing of my hypotheses is unfortunately not possible at this time, they also                
present future paths for research. 
5.3 Discussion of Findings 
In sum, the only significant relationships consistently found are mobile device usage and             
regime coercion as respect for physical rights. Mobile device usage was found to be the most                
consistently significant across all models including alternate specifications, with a positive           
relationship throughout. Regime coercion was found to be significant across a majority of             
models - and always with a negative sign. Regime type, GINI, and their interaction were the                
most inconsistent both in sign and significance. 
 
Multi-party regimes are the only regime type found to be statistically significant in my main               
regression. I consider that this may reflect both that they are the most numerous and               
potentially institutionalize political competition and dissent to a higher degree. They are not             
found significant when examining V-Dem data. This could indicate that multi-party regimes            
are significant in event occurrence, but not when both scale and frequency are considered.              
Similarly, one-party regimes are found significant for V-Dem data but not MM, which could              
indicate the opposite - that one-party regimes are significant when both scale and frequency              
are considered, but not in relationship to event occurrence alone. 
 
Combined with consistent significance for one-party and multi-party main effects in my            
alternative models, this suggests differing effects for regimes. But greater research is needed             
to establish this, since their interaction effects were not consistently significant. The regime             
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type categories used might lack important dimensions reflecting their political environment.           41
Alternatively, the key interactions that lead to mobilization may not lie with the regime              
structure itself, but be found in different institutional aspects or grievances.  
 
The lack of significance for inequality as measured by disposable GINI - even when              
interacted with regime categories - is echoed by previous findings in the literature. I consider               
it may reflect criticisms that grievances have more to do with perceived inequality by citizens,               
not the actual levels as measured (Gimpelson and Treisman 2018). 
 
The results from my alternative models using yearly GINI differences may support this             
conclusion. The difference in estimated GINI from the previous year was found significant by              
itself when including interaction terms and main effects for Monarchies and Multi-party            
regimes. For one-party and multi-party regimes, the interaction of GINI and regime type was              
also found to be significant, showing a positive relationship with multi-party regimes but a              
negative relationship for one-party regimes. This is despite GINI itself being insignificant in             
the model examining one-party regimes, and strongly negative in the model examining            
Multi-Party regimes. I suggest that this may point towards both the regime effects theorized              
and the importance of relative changes in a grievance (Kurer et al. 2019). But this claim                
requires further evaluation and testing. 
 
Another possibility exists in considering Østby’s characterization of GINI as an individualistic            
approach to inequality mistakenly used to explain a group action (Østby 2008). My null              
findings would appear to support this criticism, and my results could suggest that inequality              
as measured is not significant. Rather, what might be significant is ​horizontal ​inequality within              
groups, regardless of the objective measurement, in line with previous findings (Grasso and             
Giugni 2016; Østby 2008). This would be an excellent topic for future research. 
 
The significance found for ICT agrees with past studies in the literature and my own               
expectations. Overall, these findings support research linking higher levels of ICT with higher             
political protest by increasing mobilization across distances and time (Christensen and           
Groshek 2019; Weidmann and Rød 2019).  42
 
Although opposite of my expectations, the findings for coercion suggest that it may not              
repress protest as much as thought, all else considered equal. These results fit with previous               
evidence, such as the reciprocal relationship of repression and protest previously described            
(Carey 2006; Moore 1998). While previous work finds that repressive systems have lower             
levels of protest, this is almost always in the terms of global comparison to democracies               
(Dalton and van Sickle 2005). 
 
This relationship could also be curvilinear, based on the evidence of the literature alongside              
previous findings (Opp and Roehl 1990). This would mean that protest might decrease with              
41 See: Section 5.4 Limitations and Future Research. 
42 See also: Weidmann and Rød 2019; Guriev and Treisman 2015; Goebel 2013; Casper and Tyson                
2014; Stein 2016. 
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improved human rights, but also with severe repression - targeted violence in response to              
protests can deter participation by increasing costs and risk. This could be explored in future               
research. Since this model relies on country-clustered effects, there is the additional            
possibility that this relationship is different at the country-level than it is when comparing              
globally. 
 
Finally, the significance (or lack thereof) of these results might reflect relationships with event              
occurrence, but not necessarily their size or duration. I attempted to account for this by               
including the V-Dem measurement of democratic mobilization, In the models using the            
V-Dem mobilization variable, the significance for cultural diversity suggests a similar           
association. Cultural diversity appears strongly significant when protest scope and frequency           
are considered, implying it could be a catalyst for larger movements. Future research is              
needed to clearly disentangle this relationship.  43
 
Based on the collective estimations of Model 1 for all datasets, I reject ​H1 and accept the null                  
hypothesis. I conclude that inequality among autocracies does not appear to have a             
significant relationship with mass mobilization events per year, when all else is considered             
equal. 
 
For ​H2​, I also accept the null hypothesis and conclude that the interaction of regime type with                 
economic inequality does not appear to motivate protest occurrence. While some significant            
results were observed, these are inconsistent. Multi-party and one-party regimes showed           
some significant relationships for their main effects, but regime type interactions with GINI             
were not consistently replicated. I do not feel confident in the results of GINI change without                
additional investigation, since their findings are not supported consistently across my models. 
 
For ​H3​, I again accept the null hypothesis. Based on the estimations of my data, violent                
coercion appears to increase protest occurrence when all else is considered equal. This may              
point to the larger disagreements found in the literature, or possible a nonlinear relationship              
not captured by my models. 
 
For ​H4​, I reject the null hypothesis and accept ​H4​. Based on the evidence of my models, ICT                  
usage appears to show a positive relationship with mass mobilization, when all else is              
considered equal. According to the data, this positive correlation can only be said to be               
evident for mobile device subscriptions, not internet usage as a whole. Importantly, this             
relationship appears to be with the overall density of usage as a percentage of the               
population. 
  
43 See: Section 5.4 Limitations and Future Research. 
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5.4 Limitations and Future Research 
Although this is only a first analysis, both the subject matter and results (or lack thereof)                
show potential for deeper investigation. The models and methodology could be built upon in              
various aspects. 
 
Alternative data from the The Mass Mobilization in Autocracies Database (MMAD), was            
planned for inclusion but found to be too limited (​N​=313) for the time period. Extremely large                
coefficients were also estimated, indicating issues of reliability. 
 
Admittedly, protest data sources are limited, but there are aspects that could be better              
acknowledged. The most significant improvement would be to incorporate a measurement of            
event size or duration, instead of frequency (something done only partially in the MM dataset,               
and more fully in MMAD data). My main results can best be understood as representing               
relationships with protest events occuring, but not necessarily their size or longevity. I             
partially accounted for this with V-Dem’s measurement for mobilization, but a better dataset             
which incorporated size, longevity, and frequency would more clearly establish relationships           
with mobilization. 
 
Perceived horizontal inequality and changes in inequality offer alternative perspectives.          
Examining group-level divisions within countries or macro-fluctuations between years might          
be a more fruitful approach than relying on static measurements of GINI. But limited data               
may still be a problem. Any relationship with inequality could be nonlinear (as previously              
theorized) (Nagel 1973)), as might many such relationships.  
 
More deeply examining the linkage between economic inequality and political polarisation is            
another avenue. While I examined the link between inequality and protest, I did not include a                
relationship with political polarisation - which may help determine whether inequality does or             
does not lead to protest (Griffin and De Jonge 2014). 
 
The inconsistent findings for regime categories in my alternative models deserves deeper            
investigation. Another improvement might be to reconsider the use of rigid regime type             
categories altogether, and instead focus on other regime characteristics. The significance of            
multi-party regimes may be due to an inherent quality of that regime type, or simply represent                
that it has the widest variation and most data points. This is unknown. Considering Svolik’s               
criticisms that classifying dictatorships into a single typology is neither exclusive nor            
exhaustive (Svolik 2012, 21), perhaps focusing on specific aspects would yield improved            
insight. For example my models lack a variable for current political mobilisation - which may               




Using continuous measurements of regime qualities and key features identified as relevant            
(such as legislatures ) would be a start. Although not performed in this analysis, the use of                44
related variables from datasets such as V-Dem or the forthcoming Varieties of            
Autocratization project offer perhaps a better way to capture these aspects. This would also              
eliminate issues with insufficient observations within categories, and illuminate differences          
and similarities across regime types that have gone unacknowledged. 
 
Future investigation could operationalize coercion in a more nuanced way. Disentangling the            
relationship of human rights scores with protest might require considering regime loyalty,            
legitimacy, and grievance types. Further research building on past work examining           
event-level concessions, disruption costs, and the use of violence would also be suitable             
(Klein and Regan 2018; Moore 1998). This could include measurement of a regime's             
response to protests, and how the use of violence by either side affects protest and coercion.                
Any potential curvilinear effect of coercion is supported by previous research and could be              
investigated (Opp and Roehl 1990; Moore 1998).  
 
The significant findings for ICT deserve further investigation alongside coercion. Previous           
research suggests that digital repression serves as a more general, “softer” substitute for             
other forms of coercion at the cost of regime durability (Weidmann and Rød 2019; Frantz and                
Kendall-Taylor 2014; Guriev and Treisman 2015). Since both violent coercion and ICT usage             
appear to have significant relationships with protest, this equilibrium could explain how            
repression and ICT interact to produce different outcomes. 
 
Regarding ICT usage, there is room for improvement in how this variable is operationalized.              
While mobile devices and internet usage are relevant according to the literature, both             
categories overlap greatly when considering the nature of smartphones. While SMS           
messaging and phone calls may certainly be used where internet access is limited or shut               
down, many phone services allow internet access through mobile networks in lieu of Wifi.              
Operationalizing ICT in a manner which better captured both mobile and internet usage             
collectively would be preferable. 
 
Some previous research found that Internet use ​reduced ​protest in more liberal countries             
(Weidmann and Rød 2019). Together with findings by Garrett that ICT yield different effects              
when used in different contexts (Garrett 2006), this would suggest additional research could             
perhaps focus on the same types of regime type interactions theorized here for inequality. 
 
Although I was unable to incorporate it into this analysis, overall governmental transparency             
is an under-researched informational element, and it is mentioned in the literature as possibly              
increasing the frequency of mobilization among autocracies (Hollyer, Rosendorff, and          
Vreeland 2013). This may have implications for regimes with participatory political           
institutions, since they signal information and generate credibility by transparency. This was            
44 See: Bove and Rivera 2015; Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014; Wilson and Piazza 2013; Gandhi and                
Przeworski 2006 among others.  
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not specifically included in my analysis due to unavailable data, possible collinearity with             
regime categories, and because it is outside the main scope. Nevertheless, I acknowledge it              
here for future research. 
 
Finally, additional estimation using imputed data would be recommended in order to            
eliminate any possible bias from missing observations. This would be comparable to the             
approach taken by Frantz and Kendall-Taylor as well as Houle, among others (Frantz and              
Kendall-Taylor 2014; Houle 2009).  
 
Overall I consider that the findings of my model (and lack thereof) contributes in supporting               
that of previous literature and pointing the way towards future research. 
6. Conclusion 
The relationship of inequality with protest is admittedly complex, especially within autocratic            
contexts. Economic inequality has been theorized to alternately motivate or discourage social            
and political unrest. The literature suggests a number of explanatory factors that influence             
mobilization, including the environment of the political regime, the use of coercion to             
suppress opposition, and technologies which enable communication and information sharing.  
 
Grievances alone may not be sufficient to fulfill the ​collective ​requirement of collective action.              
Whether dissatisfaction transforms into mobilization depends on the issue, the available           
resources, and the opportunities available to potential actors. 
 
Autocracies are not collectively uniform, but represent varied arrangements of institutions.           
They differ in bases and maintenance of power. Aspects such as political parties and              
legislatures may institutionalize dissent or redirect it; the use of violent coercion may deter or               
outrage political opposition; reliance on different forms of loyalty structures may shift            
calculations for opposition. These differences correspond to different policy choices and           
resulting outcomes. 
 
Along with globalization, the development of information technology has affected how we            
interact and communicate. Mobile phones are no longer limited to device-to-device calls and             
SMS, but are internet-enabled multimedia devices. App-based innovations have enabled new           
forms of networks that complement - and in some instances replace - traditional state              
infrastructure. Paradoxically, these technologies offer new pathways for autocratic rule even           
as they strengthen democratic opposition and help circumvent authoritarian control. 
 
Through considering how these elements interact, I have contributed to existing gaps in the              
literature. In contrast to previous research, I chose to examine autocracies and their variation              
exclusively, not in comparison to democracies. I built upon preceding work by acknowledging             
the institutional differences used for categorization. I further considered how the structure            
and tactics of regime categories may moderate any relationship of inequality and            
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mobilization. I also examined whether or not inequality has a significant impact on its own.  
 
My research utilized a recent dataset of global protest events, made more contemporary by              
limiting it between 1990-2014. Restricting the scope of my analysis allowed me to include              
communications technology alongside other elements from the literature identified as          
relevant. I considered not only the presence of such technology, but the effect when              
measured in relationship to the total population. 
 
These findings suggest that national economic inequality is less significant than expected in             
relation to protest occurrence. Whether or not regimes engage in violent coercion appears             
important. Overall, increased respect for physical human rights is linked with less, not greater              
protest, but there is reason to suspect that this relationship may not be strictly linear. Protest                
appears to be significantly connected to the proportion of mobile device usage among the              
population. 
 
In sum, any impact of economic inequality alone appears outweighed by the effects of              
improved human rights and new communications technologies. These findings give some           
unique insights and new perspectives for broader analyses. 
 
Since the availability of protest data is the largest barrier to studying mobilization within              
autocracies, complementing estimates of protest event occurrence with values for their size            
should be a priority. This would offer a more complete picture of mobilization, and allow us to                 
better differentiate relationships with event occurrence from size or longevity. 
 
The significance found for regime coercion is relevant, especially with regards to global             
governance. This may suggest that political discontent is best reduced by improving human             
rights rather than reducing income inequality. Encouraging co-optive institutions, even limited           
ones, may accomplish this through providing alternatives to both coercion and protest. 
 
Economic inequality may not motivate mobilization. This could suggest that other inequalities            
and grievances are more important. Protest may instead be linked to group-based            
perceptions or alternative grievances such as corruption, historical discontent, or government           
competence. Reconsidering the relationship of economic inequality to protest might allow           
such elements to be uncovered and addressed through targeted policy efforts. 
 
Alternatively, GINI may be significant but under different moderating conditions. Regime           
categories, explored as one such condition, appear to have potential significance but not in              
the manner I theorized. Some aspects remain unexplored, such as accounting for political             
mobilisation or elements such as legislatures and independent political organisations. If           
inequality leads to mobilization, the key interactions may not lie with the regime type itself but                
in these other institutional aspects instead. 
 
Future research should attempt to disentangle the effect of influential one-party regimes such             
as China and unravel the contradiction of multi-party autocracies. Multi-party regimes are the             
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most numerous and may institutionalize political dissent to a higher degree. But it’s unclear              
whether higher protest among them corresponds to their greater number; inherent political            
competition, greater dissatisfaction, relationship with coercion, or all of these. More study is             
needed to illuminate this relationship. Currently they constitute a political Ourobouros, where            
it’s unclear whether their institutions lead to dissent or merely embrace it. 
 
On a global level, I suggest that such research can provide insight into when autocratic               
governance structures do contribute to peace and good governance. Though they are not             
democracies, if even quasi-democratic aspects promote some civil engagement and stability           
then I suggest they are worth promoting. As aptly expressed by Davenport, “in lieu of full                
democratization, alternatives exist” (Davenport 2007b). 
 
These structural variations are important, since the literature shows that they affect the             
nature of regime policies and determine resulting outcomes. In studying the correlation of             
protest with specific structures, we can analyze citizen dissent and political engagement, and             
through policy efforts encourage structural improvements that benefit both citizens and the            
regime itself. While inequality remains problematic, in creating such environments we can            
perhaps give greater voice to the perspectives of citizens themselves. 
 
In conclusion, the relevance of inequality and popular protest to good governance is clear,              
and appropriate to reconsider in the current global climate. I have shown that a number of                
avenues exist for additional investigation and future policy building. By closely studying            
autocratic regimes and considering their successes and failures, we can better understand            
how government can be improved, where democracy may begin, and how it may be              
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A2. Summary Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  STATA Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Protest  protest  1968  2.584  5.143  0  91 
Democratic Mobilization  v2cademmob  1519  -0.181  1.415  -2.744  3.658 
Regime Type (Collapsed)  regime1ny  2024  3.192  1.104  1  4 
Monarchies  regime1ny=1  245         
Military  regime1ny=2  342         
One-Party  regime1ny=3  217         
Multi-Party  regime1ny=4  1220         
GINI (Disposable)  gini_disp  1407  40.375  6.592  21.9  58.7 
Human Rights Protection 
Score 




it_cel_pop  2002  27.688  42.146  0  205.91 
GDP Per Capita, (Logged, 
base 10) 




ny_gdp_totl_rt_zs  1943  12.241  13.846  0  86.453 
Population  e_wb_pop  2064  38443144  1.44E+08  69507  1.36E+09 
Urban Population 
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sp_urb_totl_in_zs  2034  46.992  22.626  5.416  100 
Cultural Diversity  fe_cultdiv  1890  0.355  0.209  0  0.733 
Unemployment  
(% of Labor Force) 
sl_uem_totl_zs  1917  7.201  6.433  0.2  37.976 
 
Protests By Regime Type (1990-2014) (MM Data) 
Regime Type  N  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Military  332  2.175  4.043  0  23 
Monarchy  245  1.237  2.859  0  21 
Multi-party  1162  3.149  5.829  0  91 




Protests By Country (1990-2014) (MM Data) 
Country Name  N  Mean Min  Max  Country Name  N  Mean Min  Max 
Afghanistan  11  1.273  0  6  Guinea  25  2.68  0  15 
Albania  11  3  0  11  Guinea-Bissau  24  0.958  0  6 
Algeria  25  1.36  0  11  Guyana  2  0  0  0 
Angola  12  0.417  0  2  Haiti  23  3.565  0  10 
Armenia  22  3.045  0  8  Honduras  5  2.8  0  6 
Azerbaijan  24  5.042  0  20  India  2  4  3  5 
Bahrain  25  1.64  0  9  Indonesia  14  6.714  1  23 
Bangladesh  18  14.278  2  60  Iraq  23  3.043  0  14 
Belarus  23  2.565  0  10  Ivory Coast  25  3.96  0  14 
Bhutan  25  0.08  0  1  Jordan  25  1.52  0  15 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  19  0.737  0  5  Kazakhstan  25  3.12  0  11 
Burkina Faso  24  2.292  0  22  Kenya  14  2.929  0  8 
Burma/Myanmar  25  2.24  0  21  Kuwait  24  1.542  0  11 
Burundi  21  2.238  0  8  Kyrgyzstan  25  6.28  0  34 
Cambodia  22  1.818  0  8  Laos  25  0.08  0  1 
Cameroon  25  1.64  0  13  Latvia  0  .  .  . 
Cape Verde  1  0  0  0  Lebanon  23  2.087  0  7 
Central African Republic  24  2.333  0  8  Lesotho  11  2  0  5 
Chad  22  0.318  0  2  Liberia  16  2.188  0  7 
China  25  8.24  0  36  Libya  3  4.333  1  7 
Colombia  9  5.444  2  12  Lithuania  1  1  1  1 
Comoros  16  2.563  0  13  Madagascar  8  3.875  0  17 
Croatia  9  0.556  0  3  Malawi  18  2.056  0  7 
Cuba  25  0.2  0  2  Malaysia  25  4.24  0  12 
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
25  2.04  0  8  Maldives  0  .  .  . 
Djibouti  25  0.4  0  2  Mali  4  2.25  0  5 
Dominican Republic  2  4  2  6  Mauritania  25  2.92  0  12 
Egypt  24  3.667  0  22  Mexico  10  5.8  1  12 
El Salvador  1  0  0  0  Moldova  6  3.667  1  10 
Equatorial Guinea  25  0.16  0  1  Mongolia  2  7.5  3  12 
Eritrea  25  0.08  0  1  Montenegro  0  .  .  . 
Estonia  0  .  .  .  Morocco  25  0.8  0  6 
Eswatini  25  3.6  0  14  Mozambique  23  2.696  0  8 
Ethiopia  25  0.92  0  3  Nepal  20  6.45  1  17 
Fiji  0  .  .  .  Nicaragua  6  3.333  1  5 
Gabon  25  1.28  0  6  Niger  18  4.722  0  12 
Georgia  19  2.053  0  6  Nigeria  25  1.36  0  10 
German Democratic 
Republic 
1  11  11  11  North Korea  25  0.32  0  2 
Ghana  11  1.364  0  6  North Macedonia  7  3.286  1  6 
Guatemala  12  3.417  0  10  Oman  25  1  0  21 
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Country Name  N  Mean Min  Max  Country Name  N  Mean Min  Max 
Pakistan  25  5.92  0  20  Sudan  25  0.92  0  8 
Papua New Guinea  6  1.333  0  3  Suriname  10  3.2  0  13 
Paraguay  3  0.333  0  1  Syria  21  0.238  0  3 
Peru  9  5.111  2  9  Taiwan  3  7.333  5  11 
Qatar  25  0.04  0  1  Tajikistan  25  1.28  0  8 
Republic of the Congo  18  1.056  0  8  Tanzania  25  1.4  0  8 
Romania  6  19.333  0  63  Thailand  11  12  0  23 
Russia  23  6.652  1  19  The Gambia  21  0.19  0  2 
Rwanda  25  0.4  0  3  Timor-Leste  0  .  .  . 
Sao Tome and Principe  0  .  .  .  Togo  21  2.667  0  12 
Saudi Arabia  25  0.76  0  7  Tunisia  23  0.609  0  6 
Senegal  10  0.9  0  5  Turkey  10  4.2  0  21 
Serbia  3  12  1  25  Turkmenistan  25  0.16  0  1 
Seychelles  0  .  .  .  Uganda  25  1.96  0  8 
Sierra Leone  12  0.5  0  2  Ukraine  10  12.6  2  91 
Singapore  25  0.32  0  5  United Arab Emirates  25  0.12  0  1 
Slovenia  0  .  .  .  Uzbekistan  25  1.44  0  13 
Solomon Islands  0  .  .  .  Venezuela  16  10.063  0  18 
Somalia  4  0.75  0  3  Vietnam  25  0.6  0  2 
South Africa  4  17  11  25  Yemen  21  5.095  0  58 
South Yemen  0  .  .  .  Zambia  16  3.063  0  12 




A3. Descriptive Graphs 
FIGURE A1. Coercion & Protests Among Autocracies 
 




A4. Results Using Disposable GINI Difference 
Table A1. ​Models 1-5 (MM Data) (GINI Difference from previous year) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Protest (Sum)  0.357***  0.352***  0.350***  0.344***  0.333*** 
  (0.112)  (0.113)  (0.112)  (0.112)  (0.112) 
Disposable GINI (Difference)  -1.423*  -1.472**  -1.224*  -0.880  -4.994*** 
  (0.735)  (0.748)  (0.713)  (0.727)  (1.363) 
Monarchy    -0.895*       
    (0.480)       
Monarchy # Disposable GINI = 1    4.944       
    (3.285)       
Military Regime      -0.806*     
      (0.461)     
Military # Disposable GINI = 1      -3.282     
      (2.087)     
One-Party Regime        -1.120*   
        (0.591)   
One-Party # Disposable GINI = 1        -5.503**   
        (2.363)   
Multi-Party Regime          1.107*** 
          (0.355) 
Multi-Party # Disposable GINI = 1          4.337*** 
          (1.532) 
Human Rights Protection Score  -0.800***  -0.816***  -0.936***  -0.619***  -0.792*** 
  (0.212)  (0.216)  (0.222)  (0.219)  (0.215) 
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (% of Population)  0.0230***  0.0241***  0.0234***  0.0209***  0.0217*** 
  (0.00628)  (0.00642)  (0.00629)  (0.00637)  (0.00622) 
GDP Per Capita, Logged, Base 10  0.0801  0.0179  0.0217  0.167  0.186 
  (0.155)  (0.152)  (0.153)  (0.153)  (0.146) 
Total Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP)  -0.0196  -0.0219  -0.0180  -0.00996  -0.0111 
  (0.0148)  (0.0155)  (0.0152)  (0.0153)  (0.0148) 
Population  3.60e-09***  3.59e-09***  3.37e-09***  5.90e-09***  5.19e-09*** 
  (1.18e-09)  (1.17e-09)  (1.16e-09)  (1.35e-09)  (1.21e-09) 
Urban Population (% of total population)  -0.00478  -0.00105  -0.00523  -0.00965  -0.0143* 
  (0.00703)  (0.00766)  (0.00717)  (0.00769)  (0.00791) 
Cultural Diversity  0.0424  -0.0712  -0.111  -0.395  -0.601 
  (0.817)  (0.820)  (0.805)  (0.918)  (0.892) 
Unemployment, Total  (% of labor force) (ILO)  -0.00268  0.00182  -0.00780  -0.0155  -0.00772 
  (0.0166)  (0.0156)  (0.0174)  (0.0198)  (0.0170) 
Constant  0.595  0.998  1.210  0.499  -0.391 
  (1.191)  (1.150)  (1.227)  (1.074)  (0.957) 
Observations  1,077  1,077  1,077  1,077  1,077 
R-squared  0.187  0.189  0.190  0.195  0.199 
Number of Countries (COWcode)  80  80  80  80  80 
Standard errors in parentheses           




A5. Results Using V-Dem Data 
Table A2. ​Models 1-5 (V-Dem Data) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Democratic Mobilization  0.854***  0.846***  0.849***  0.821***  0.820*** 
  (0.0300)  (0.0311)  (0.0302)  (0.0350)  (0.0338) 
Disposable GINI  0.00216  0.00544  0.00348  -0.00166  0.00530 
  (0.00302)  (0.00368)  (0.00319)  (0.00311)  (0.00436) 
Monarchy    0.0884       
    (0.452)       
Monarchy # Disposable GINI = 1    -0.00489       
    (0.00933)       
Military Regime      0.718     
      (0.480)     
Military # Disposable GINI = 1      -0.0197*     
      (0.0116)     
One-Party Regime        -2.168***   
        (0.709)   
One-Party # Disposable GINI = 1        0.0552***   
        (0.0211)   
Multi-Party Regime          0.296 
          (0.226) 
Multi-Party # Disposable GINI = 1          -0.00246 
          (0.00543) 
Human Rights Protection Score  -0.0482*  -0.0358  -0.0632**  -0.0139  -0.0423 
  (0.0283)  (0.0314)  (0.0296)  (0.0280)  (0.0296) 
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (% of Population)  0.00181***  0.00181***  0.00199***  0.00147**  0.00185*** 
  (0.000679)  (0.000701)  (0.000693)  (0.000703)  (0.000672) 
GDP Per Capita, Logged, Base 10  -0.0800**  -0.0551  -0.1000**  -0.0662*  -0.0621 
  (0.0393)  (0.0524)  (0.0405)  (0.0386)  (0.0446) 
Total Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP)  -0.00338*  -0.00349*  -0.00345*  -0.000597  -0.00277 
  (0.00179)  (0.00186)  (0.00181)  (0.00168)  (0.00173) 
Population  -1.58e-10**  -1.64e-10**  -2.04e-10*** -1.37e-10  -1.15e-10* 
  (6.71e-11)  (8.01e-11)  (6.43e-11)  (2.22e-10)  (6.33e-11) 
Urban Population (% of total population)  0.00329**  0.00297*  0.00333**  0.00249**  0.00235 
  (0.00138)  (0.00158)  (0.00140)  (0.00126)  (0.00153) 
Cultural Diversity  0.284***  0.306***  0.291***  0.267**  0.290*** 
  (0.105)  (0.109)  (0.106)  (0.109)  (0.103) 
Unemployment, Total  (% of labor force)  0.00416  0.00556*  0.00357  0.00120  0.00238 
  (0.00312)  (0.00299)  (0.00310)  (0.00321)  (0.00305) 
Constant  0.260  -0.0590  0.375  0.399  -0.0974 
  (0.279)  (0.428)  (0.274)  (0.295)  (0.278) 
Observations  881  880  880  880  880 
R-squared  0.807  0.805  0.804  0.815  0.815 
Number of Countries (COWcode)  63  63  63  63  63 
Standard errors in parentheses           




A6. Alternate Model Specifications 
Results using XTPCSE Specification 
Models 1-5 (MM Data) (Panel-Specific AR1 Autocorrelation) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Protest  0.332***  0.326***  0.326***  0.318***  0.309*** 
  (0.105)  (0.106)  (0.104)  (0.105)  (0.105) 
Disposable GINI  -0.116**  -0.124*  -0.122*  -0.131**  -0.00223 
  (0.0588)  (0.0633)  (0.0645)  (0.0637)  (0.0447) 
Monarchy    -7.084       
    (5.586)       
Monarchy # Disposable GINI = 1    0.139       
    (0.121)       
Military Regime      -3.962     
      (3.281)     
Military # Disposable GINI = 1      0.0783     
      (0.0774)     
One-Party Regime        -12.74**   
        (6.334)   
One-Party # Disposable GINI = 1        0.273*   
        (0.146)   
Multi-Party Regime          7.323** 
          (3.484) 
Multi-Party # Disposable GINI = 1          -0.149* 
          (0.0830) 
Human Rights Protection Score  -0.748***  -0.749***  -0.862***  -0.614***  -0.854*** 
  (0.180)  (0.173)  (0.166)  (0.195)  (0.164) 
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (% of Population)  0.0473***  0.0476***  0.0479***  0.0454***  0.0467*** 
  (0.0106)  (0.0105)  (0.0107)  (0.0106)  (0.0105) 
GDP Per Capita, Logged, Base 10  -0.111  -0.191  -0.0710  0.00680  -0.0647 
  (0.250)  (0.327)  (0.242)  (0.247)  (0.255) 
Total Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP)  -0.0364*  -0.0396*  -0.0391*  -0.0324  -0.0413* 
  (0.0205)  (0.0225)  (0.0212)  (0.0216)  (0.0229) 
Population  2.12e-09**  2.07e-09**  1.95e-09**  3.56e-09***  2.83e-09*** 
  (9.60e-10)  (9.60e-10)  (9.42e-10)  (1.26e-09)  (9.96e-10) 
Urban Population (% of total population)  -0.0220  -0.0158  -0.0256*  -0.0278*  -0.0255 
  (0.0144)  (0.0195)  (0.0155)  (0.0144)  (0.0158) 
Cultural Diversity  -1.257  -1.359  -1.220  -1.562  -1.561 
  (1.146)  (1.151)  (1.214)  (1.200)  (1.284) 
Unemployment, Total  (% of labor force)  0.0157  0.0128  0.0119  0.00411  -0.00483 
  (0.0256)  (0.0297)  (0.0256)  (0.0258)  (0.0298) 
Constant  8.262*  9.119*  8.437**  8.511*  2.712 
  (4.237)  (4.848)  (4.279)  (4.399)  (3.024) 
Observations  1,146  1,146  1,146  1,146  1,146 
R-squared  0.354  0.355  0.354  0.357  0.356 
Number of Countries (COWcode)  85  85  85  85  85 
Standard errors in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
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Results using XTGLS Specification 
Models 1-5 (MM Data) (Panel-Specific AR1 Autocorrelation) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Protest  0.328***  0.319***  0.322***  0.310***  0.303*** 
  (0.0320)  (0.0319)  (0.0319)  (0.0319)  (0.0318) 
Disposable GINI  -0.117***  -0.124***  -0.116***  -0.115***  0.0398 
  (0.0221)  (0.0236)  (0.0216)  (0.0204)  (0.0495) 
Monarchy    -11.60***       
    (3.824)       
Monarchy # Disposable GINI = 1    0.231***       
    (0.0887)       
Military Regime      -4.517     
      (3.155)     
Military # Disposable GINI = 1      0.0863     
      (0.0777)     
One-Party Regime        -12.35**   
        (5.662)   
One-Party # Disposable GINI = 1        0.260*   
        (0.144)   
Multi-Party Regime          8.193*** 
          (2.198) 
Multi-Party # Disposable GINI = 1          -0.161*** 
          (0.0539) 
Human Rights Protection Score  -0.865***  -0.946***  -0.972***  -0.707***  -0.968*** 
  (0.209)  (0.214)  (0.217)  (0.210)  (0.207) 
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (% of Population)  0.0453***  0.0450***  0.0446***  0.0409***  0.0403*** 
  (0.00464)  (0.00455)  (0.00461)  (0.00446)  (0.00437) 
GDP Per Capita, Logged, Base 10  -0.318  -0.573  -0.201  -0.0650  -0.140 
  (0.326)  (0.362)  (0.329)  (0.316)  (0.315) 
Total Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP)  -0.0403***  -0.0482***  -0.0354***  -0.0245***  -0.0283*** 
  (0.0116)  (0.0124)  (0.00970)  (0.00750)  (0.00798) 
Population  2.23e-09***  2.22e-09***  2.03e-09***  3.77e-09***  3.29e-09*** 
  (7.61e-10)  (7.66e-10)  (7.68e-10)  (1.18e-09)  (7.81e-10) 
Urban Population (% of total population)  -0.0140  -0.00255  -0.0182  -0.0192*  -0.0174 
  (0.0117)  (0.0131)  (0.0121)  (0.0116)  (0.0118) 
Cultural Diversity  -1.164  -1.302  -1.181  -1.646*  -1.628* 
  (0.922)  (0.925)  (0.938)  (0.917)  (0.938) 
Unemployment, Total  (% of labor force)  0.0310  0.0347  0.0186  0.00552  0.000102 
  (0.0335)  (0.0357)  (0.0321)  (0.0322)  (0.0325) 
Constant  9.540***  11.49***  8.868***  8.113***  0.877 
  (2.539)  (2.864)  (2.450)  (2.353)  (2.980) 
Observations  1,141  1,141  1,141  1,141  1,141 
R-squared  -  -  -  -  - 
Number of Countries (COWcode)  80  80  80  80  80 
Standard errors in parentheses           




Results using XTREG Specification 
Models 1-5 (MM Data) (Fixed Effects, Country Clusters) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Protest  0.117  0.117  0.117  0.117  0.117 
  (0.0807)  (0.0809)  (0.0809)  (0.0805)  (0.0807) 
Disposable GINI  -0.0696  -0.0677  -0.0728  -0.0531  -0.0912 
  (0.208)  (0.213)  (0.213)  (0.209)  (0.202) 
Monarchy    4.173       
    (17.12)       
Monarchy # Disposable GINI = 1    -0.100       
    (0.425)       
Military Regime      -0.791     
      (2.466)     
Military # Disposable GINI = 1      0.0175     
      (0.0540)     
One-Party Regime        4.530   
        (4.014)   
One-Party # Disposable GINI = 1        -0.116   
        (0.101)   
Multi-Party Regime          -1.344 
          (1.654) 
Multi-Party # Disposable GINI = 1          0.0330 
          (0.0427) 
Human Rights Protection Score  -0.729  -0.722  -0.733  -0.750  -0.745 
  (0.605)  (0.624)  (0.646)  (0.609)  (0.651) 
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (% of Population)  0.0261*  0.0262*  0.0261*  0.0267*  0.0264* 
  (0.0141)  (0.0140)  (0.0142)  (0.0142)  (0.0141) 
GDP Per Capita, Logged, Base 10  0.769  0.757  0.776  0.720  0.744 
  (1.061)  (1.083)  (1.061)  (1.080)  (1.072) 
Total Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP)  -0.00121  -0.00113  -0.000682  0.00115  -0.000671 
  (0.0339)  (0.0341)  (0.0350)  (0.0338)  (0.0343) 
Population  6.56e-08***  6.57e-08***  6.60e-08***  6.99e-08***  6.61e-08*** 
  (1.86e-08)  (1.86e-08)  (1.92e-08)  (2.12e-08)  (1.92e-08) 
Urban Population (% of total population)  -0.0353  -0.0363  -0.0366  -0.0397  -0.0366 
  (0.102)  (0.102)  (0.107)  (0.102)  (0.105) 
Cultural Diversity (Omitted)  -  -  -  -  - 
  -  -  -  -  - 
Unemployment, Total  (% of labor force)  0.130  0.130  0.131  0.131  0.128 
  (0.0846)  (0.0849)  (0.0858)  (0.0858)  (0.0849) 
Constant  -4.706  -4.625  -4.609  -5.106  -3.601 
  (13.20)  (13.21)  (13.32)  (13.26)  (13.10) 
Observations  1,146  1,146  1,146  1,146  1,146 
R-squared  0.084  0.084  0.084  0.085  0.084 
Number of Countries (COWcode)  85  85  85  85  85 
Standard errors in parentheses           





Results using XTNBREG Specification 
Models 1-5 (MM Data) (Fixed Effects) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Protest  0.0226***  0.0218***  0.0155***  0.0226***  0.0222*** 
  (0.00444)  (0.00448)  (0.00457)  (0.00446)  (0.00445) 
Disposable GINI  0.0411***  0.0412***  0.0348***  0.0417***  0.0349* 
  (0.0111)  (0.0117)  (0.0107)  (0.0115)  (0.0178) 
Monarchy    -3.996**       
    (1.870)       
Monarchy # Disposable GINI = 1    0.0678       
    (0.0414)       
Military Regime      0.467     
      (1.086)     
Military # Disposable GINI = 1      -0.0131     
      (0.0259)     
One-Party Regime        0.191   
        (1.168)   
One-Party # Disposable GINI = 1        -0.00799   
        (0.0302)   
Multi-Party Regime          -0.161 
          (0.758) 
Multi-Party # Disposable GINI = 1          0.00848 
          (0.0181) 
Human Rights Protection Score  -0.0904  -0.0798  -0.0272  -0.0894  -0.105 
  (0.0667)  (0.0682)  (0.0714)  (0.0669)  (0.0675) 
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (% of Population)  0.00355***  0.00349***  0.00399***  0.00354***  0.00354*** 
  (0.00124)  (0.00124)  (0.00121)  (0.00124)  (0.00124) 
GDP Per Capita, Logged, Base 10  0.0995  0.0619  0.0338  0.102  0.117 
  (0.119)  (0.128)  (0.119)  (0.119)  (0.120) 
Total Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP)  0.00404  0.00260  0.00418  0.00411  0.00443 
  (0.00525)  (0.00525)  (0.00521)  (0.00528)  (0.00525) 
Population  8.02e-10**  7.80e-10**  6.27e-09***  8.97e-10**  9.04e-10** 
  (3.68e-10)  (3.70e-10)  (1.44e-09)  (4.26e-10)  (3.79e-10) 
Urban Population (% of total population)  0.00759  0.0106**  0.00566  0.00754  0.00634 
  (0.00502)  (0.00540)  (0.00498)  (0.00506)  (0.00506) 
Cultural Diversity  0.856**  0.716*  0.785**  0.861**  0.891** 
  (0.397)  (0.401)  (0.396)  (0.397)  (0.395) 
Unemployment, Total  (% of labor force)  -0.00356  -0.000903  0.00373  -0.00363  -0.00203 
  (0.0111)  (0.0115)  (0.0113)  (0.0112)  (0.0113) 
Constant  -3.233***  -2.965***  -2.514**  -3.276***  -3.259*** 
  (1.028)  (1.106)  (1.007)  (1.042)  (1.130) 
Observations  1,141  1,141  1,141  1,141  1,141 
R-squared           
Number of Countries (COWcode)  80  80  80  80  80 
Standard errors in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
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A7. Diagnostic Graphs 
















Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q) Plots 
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